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Abstract
This thesis problematizes geophysical disasters by examining the human
processes that affect the extent of damage incurred by these “natural” events. Using the
incredible aftermath of the 7.0 magnitude earthquake in Haiti on January 12, 2010 as a
case study, this thesis explores how foreign intervention in its various forms permeated
the country from independence to the present day and respectively impacted the scale of
devastation. In particular, this lens of foreign activity renders visible historical
vulnerabilities and fallacies of aid that have since left the country destroyed and
dependent. A critical analysis of Haitian history followed by a comprehensive assessment
of various facets of the relief effort illuminate the human implications in the devastation
that succeeded the earthquake. Ultimately, this devastation can be used to suggest that the
past and present reliance on foreign actors to rebuild and redefine the nation largely failed
to recognize local agency, hindering the development of Haitian sovereignty, capacity,
and independence. Nonetheless, despite a critical assessment of the relief effort, a point
of hope remains for future models of aid provision incorporating local agency and
downward accountability. Thus, through a synthesis of historical, environmental,
economic, and political fields of study it becomes apparent that foreign intervention has
long dictated the course of Haitian state building, and as such, that human processes are
implicated in environmental issues.

Key Words: Haiti; humanitarian aid; foreign aid; non-governmental organizations
(NGOs); earthquake; cholera; United Nations
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INTRODUCTION
On January 12, 2010, within seconds 1.5 million Haitians became homeless, 25
government buildings were reduced to rubble,1 and 45,000 to 50,000 people lost their
lives.2 On this day, the country experienced a 7.0 magnitude earthquake, a geologic event
that registered as a “Major” event on the Richter scale. Yet, the degree of loss of human
life and infrastructure far surpassed that of earthquakes of similar magnitudes. This
“natural” disaster then did not solely implicate geologic forces, as the definition of a
natural disaster may suggest. The extent of damage sustained in Haiti revealed that the
causes of devastation exceeded the work of natural processes. As such, natural disasters
implicate historical events and societal processes as well. Thus, a natural disaster cannot
merely be assessed as an isolated incident; rather, the magnitude of ruin suggests that
these events also have roots in human-made processes. This thesis demonstrates that the
Haiti earthquake unfortunately embodied this hypothesis, revealing that natural disasters
fail to be the consequence of merely geologic processes, but rather embroiling humanmade constructions and global inequalities, grounded in both history and the provision of
humanitarian aid.
From its independence in the nineteenth century to present day, Haiti faced ill
fated, reoccurring themes throughout history. A legacy of slavery and patterns of
colonialism placed the country in a subordinate, isolated position within global politics.
Internally, weak leadership characterized by a frequent turnover of power and dictatorial

1

Oliver Cunningham, “The Humanitarian Aid Regime in the Republic of NGOs: The Fallacy of Building
Back Better,” The Joseph Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies 4, (2012): 109.
2
Simon Romero and Neil MacFarquhar, “Haiti’s Many Troubles Keep Bodies Uncounted,” New York
Times, January 20, 2010, accessed January 23, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/world/americas/21deathtoll.html?_r=0.
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regimes degraded the appearance of Haiti to outsiders. These conditions coalesced to
justify repeated foreign intervention. For nearly two centuries, external actors have
determined the political and economic structures within this “independent” Caribbean
country. Liberated on French terms and infiltrated with humanitarian aid, Haiti offers a
history and present reality narrated by foreign actors. Thus, throughout the years
following independence, foreign actors remained omnipresent in the country’s affairs,
hindering the building of local sovereignty and capacity. This history established a cycle
of Haitian dependency, necessitating continual humanitarian relief which was implicated
in the aftermath of the earthquake.
While foreign actors provided necessary aid, goods, and services to the Haitian
population, this humanitarianism failed to serve the subjective needs of the local
population. Foreign aid may seem to promote respectable altruistic motives: alleviating
poverty, encouraging the spread of democracy, or supporting economic or political
transitions. However, foreign aid tends to also advance foreign policy, belittling the needs
of beneficiaries. Political, cultural, and economic ideologies can permeate humanitarian
work, ironically undermining the effective impacts of altruism. Moreover, nongovernmental organizations, as carriers of aid, display skewed accountability systems.
With a greater loyalty to donors, many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) tend to
prioritize demands from above rather than requests from below, the recipients of the aid.
As such, humanitarian aid often fails to serve local needs and incorporate local
institutions and infrastructure, completing projects incongruous with on-the-ground
conditions. Therefore, one must ask: “whom does aid serve?”
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The foreign humanitarian aid actors within Haiti exhibited these failures in the
provision of relief services following January 12, 2010. The incredible loss and
devastation incurred by the earthquake revealed the human-made processes implicated in
this “natural” disaster. Conditions throughout the country, and particularly within
Internally Displaced Persons camps, revealed the skewed systems of aid. Without an
incorporation of local knowledge, a recognition of local agency or an adherence to local
needs, this botched humanitarian aid effort sustained subhuman living conditions for
those displaced from their home following the earthquake. But more importantly,
reinforcing theoretical qualms of relief systems, foreign aid following the disaster
perpetuated Haiti’s historical reliance upon external actors. As a result of these human
processes, the country remained dependent upon the infrastructure of foreigners,
undermining the building of capacity and sovereignty.
Nonetheless, this thesis suggests that hope remains for the provision of
humanitarian aid both in Haiti and in a general context. In the midst of the earthquake
relief effort, a cholera epidemic occurred. Following this subsequent disaster within Haiti,
humanitarian aid deviated from previously debilitating models. The implementation of
ideal structures of aid incorporated local knowledge, voices, and agencies. This
participation served to benefit the Haitian population suffering from the expansive spread
of a deadly disease. In addition, this provision of foreign humanitarian aid recognized and
subsequently empowered local agencies. Through this empowerment, while only directly
impacting a specific sector of Haitian infrastructure, the country gained a sense of agency
and capacity, acquisitions instrumental along the path towards sovereignty and true
independence. Thus, the humanitarian response to the cholera epidemic became a specific
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moment in which relief pointed the way forward for a more efficient and effective form
of foreign aid.
Thus, this thesis problematizes geophysical disasters by examining the human
processes that affect the extent of damage incurred by these “natural” events. Building
upon NGO theory and an understanding of foreign aid, this thesis demonstrates that
humanitarian aid exasperated the aftermath of a 7.0 magnitude earthquake in Haiti.
Following, the argument of this thesis is three-fold. First, I argue that as human processes
are implicated in environmental issues, skewed systems of foreign aid and humanitarian
relief are directly implicated in the scale of the earthquake. Through a synthesis of
historical, political, and environmental work, it becomes apparent that foreign actors have
long dictated the course of Haitian state building or lack thereof. Second, given the
devastation that ensued after the earthquake, this thesis suggests that the past and present
reliance on external actors to rebuild and redefine the nation hindered the development of
Haitian sovereignty and perpetuated patterns of weakness and dependence that
characterize the country to date. These patterns proved detrimental to the future of Haiti,
as reliance upon foreign aid and intervention continued a cycle that impeded upon
movement towards sovereignty and independence. Third, this thesis demonstrates the
benefits of humanitarian aid that is more accountable to and inclusive of local
institutions. This model of humanitarian relief incorporating local actors points the way
towards sustainable and effective foreign aid. Within Haiti, this thesis shows that such a
model proved particularly significant in working to abandon a debilitating historical
dependence upon foreign actors and the ushering in of hope for the building of Haitian
agency and capacity.
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Literature Review
An earthquake is often naively identified as a simply a natural disaster. However,
ample scholarly work puts this identification into question. While addressing a variety of
natural disasters, scholars show that these are not purely geologic events (Cunningham
2012; Farmer 2011; Gros 2012; Katz 2013; Oliver-Smith 2012; Schuller 2012). Rather,
global inequalities are implicated in environmental issues. As such, human and social
processes affect the extent of damage incurred by a “natural” disaster (Cunningham 2012;
Farmer 2011; Gros 2012; Katz 2013; Oliver-Smith 2012; Schuller 2012). This effect can
be either beneficial in improving a state’s preparedness and ability to respond, or
incapacitating by making a population increasingly vulnerable to devastation and loss. In
the case of Haiti, the latter is the unfortunate reality. Historical intervention imbricated
with the arrival of foreign aid and humanitarian relief organizations constrained and
informed the conditions of the country following the earthquake.
Prior to the earthquake, the arrival of neoliberalism fostered the overwhelming
inundation of non-governmental organizations into communities both across the globe
and specifically within Haiti, an inundation later implicated in the aftermath of the
“natural” disaster. Much debate surrounds the forms of neoliberalism. Wendy Larner
(2000), articulates these forms, asserting that neoliberalism can serve as a policy, an
ideology, or to paraphrase Foucault, as governmentality. While acknowledging the
legitimacy of neoliberalism as an ideology in which power is hegemonic and as a
governmentality affecting systems of meaning that constitute institutions, this thesis
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interprets neoliberalism as a set of policies that shift the political agenda (Larner 2000).
This policy enacts changes to economic, political and social spheres of civil society
(Castree 2010; Larner 2000). Scholars find that in hopes of improving economic
efficiency, neoliberalism implemented privatization, free markets, free trade, the growth
of a third sector, and a shrinking reliance upon state-provided goods and services (Castree
2010; Edwards and Hulme 1996; Harvey 2005; Klak 1997; Peet and Hartwick 2009). As
a result, neoliberalism changed the role of the state, shifting political responsibilities.
Scholars then cite this policy change as making states less active in the provision of
goods for the welfare of the general population (Held and McGrew 2002; Larner 2000).
However, most importantly, across various works, there is a general recognition that this
shift in the role of the state simultaneously creates space for new actors, nongovernmental organizations, to fill the responsibility of delivering services (Bebbington,
Hickey, and Mitlin 2008; Edwards and Hulme 1996; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Fisher
1997; Larner 2000; Uphoff 1996).
Foreign aid actors, in particular non-governmental organizations, filled the space
left vacant as a result of a changing state role, arriving in new areas of the global
community. While some scholars do recognize that foreign aid promotes altruistic
motives rather than colonial or imperial justifications, scholars simultaneously doubts
these intentions (Dreher Klasen, Vreeland, and Walker 2013; Heinrich 2013). Economists
and political scientists have critically analyzed foreign aid, better illuminating the true
realities that background the motives of this seemingly philanthropic assistance. While
economists investigate various aspects of foreign aid, most arrive at similar conclusions.
Critically approaching aid commitments, contracts, or distributions, these scholars
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suggest that foreign policy determines where aid is allocated (Alesina and Dollar 2000;
Berthélemy and Tichit 2004; Dreher, Klasen, Vreeland, and Walker 2013). In addition to
these economic approaches to understanding foreign aid, social science and political
lenses provide similar conclusions (Ali 2013; Hook 1995; Lancaster 2007; Wedel 2005).
Synthesizing historical trends of aid allocation with respective national policies, scholars
within these fields find that foreign policy impedes upon the philanthropy of foreign aid.
Thus, despite promoting democratization, the stabilization of an economy, the
abolishment of poverty, or the provision of needed goods or services, foreign aid often
encumbers rather than assists the target population.
Following an analysis of foreign aid, significant literature addresses the theory
that underlies particular providers of humanitarian aid, non-governmental organizations,
(NGOs). First, ample scholarly work recognizes the double-edged sword of NGOs (Ferris
2011; Fischer 1997; Schuller 2012). While some scholars rightfully find NGOs to be
necessary and productive, an overwhelming majority of critics find that the flaws of these
organizations ultimately undermine altruistic purposes (Riddell 2007; Uphoff 1996).
Amongst scholars critical of the ability of humanitarian aid providers to “do good,”
Michael Edwards and David Hulme (1996) identify particular cause for the flaws in the
systems of performance and accountability. On the notion of accountability, scholars
recognize the multiple conflicting loyalties of NGOs, but cite the prioritization of
upwards loyalties to financial providers, rather than the adherence to downward
accountability to local populations as impeding in the execution of humanitarian purposes
(Biggs and Neam 1996; Tandon 1996; Edwards and Hulme 1996; Ferris 2011; Fisher
1997; Schuller 2012).
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In particular, upward accountability hinders the just deliverance of aid and
development assistance through what scholars identify as a politicization and
instrumentalization of aid (Atmar 2001; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Ferris 2011).
Mohammed Atmar (2001) defines the politicization of aid as the pursuit of political
objectives by donor states. As a result, non-governmental organizations deviate from a
loyalty to the local community and beneficiaries, falling victim to political
considerations. Thus, literature on NGO theory recognizes that these organizations are
not true to their name and are not as “non-governmental” as their title suggests. But
rather, aid becomes instrumentalized and used for objectives beyond humanitarianism
(Arthus 2011; Schuller 2012). As actors and distributors of foreign aid, NGOs then
reflect previously mentioned fallacies of foreign aid within a particular organizational
context. This deviation founded upon accountability and coordination, then holds
significant consequences for those receiving aid, for example, a country like Haiti after
the earthquake in 2010.
Thus this thesis builds on these theoretical interventions with on-the-ground
research and reports. Blending various fields of study- historical, political, economic, and
environmental- this work offers a unique application of foreign aid and NGO theory to a
case study in Haiti. As a result of both examining NGO theory in practice, as well as
investigating Haiti from the time of independence to present day, this thesis argues that
the earthquake in Haiti on January 12, 2010 was not an isolated, “natural” disaster. But
rather, human activity in the form of foreign intervention throughout Haiti’s past and
present contributed to the devastation. However debilitating this presence was to the
subhuman conditions that immediately succeeded the earthquake, the cyclical foreign

14

intervention necessitated a perpetuation of this external presence, which held long-term
consequences for the sovereignty and independence of the country. Nonetheless, this
thesis concludes on a hopeful note, arguing that an incorporation of Haitian participation
in a humanitarian aid response not only recognized, but also empowered local agency to
provide instances of an abandonment of the country’s dependent history and a movement
towards the building of sovereignty and independence.

Limitations of Study
I chose to take a multidisciplinary approach to understanding the aftermath of the
Haiti earthquake. In order to blend fields of study in a unique way, I utilized a variety of
secondary sources, personal interviews, as well as meeting notes and reports. This
approach focused my thesis through an institutional lens, utilizing the resources available
to me. However, this thesis lacks the voice of the Haitians. Unable to travel to Haiti I
could not talk with Haitians and observe or interact personally with the environment. In
order to compensate for this inability to access the local voices, I used personal
interviews with Haitian scholars, Haitian activists, and foreign relief workers who spent
significant time in the country prior to and after the earthquake. While I recognize that
these interviewees maintain a second order difference from the Haitian population, they
provided valuable insights, observations, and analysis to support my focus on the
institutional and theoretical frameworks of humanitarian relied. These interviews,
combined with reports and meeting notes following the earthquake provide a significant
foundation of research on foreign intervention for critical analysis.
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Chapter Outlines
Chapter 1 provides a historical background of Haiti, introducing central themes
that coalesce for a better understanding of the humanitarian relief effort. A long-term
pattern of colonialism, a legacy of slavery, frequent foreign intervention, and recurrent
weak domestic leadership all plagued the country’s history. As a result, Haiti became
vulnerable to an inundation of foreign actors, an inundation that would prove detrimental
to the country’s capability and sovereignty following the earthquake.
Chapter 2 then provides a theoretical framework for the work of nongovernmental organizations and foreign aid. This chapter explores the arrival of massive
amounts of humanitarian organizations into Haiti at the turn of the twenty-first century in
conjunction with a theoretical explanation of this relief. It demonstrates that botched
systems of foreign aid became implicated in the capacity building of Haiti, or lack
thereof, and established how the relief effort unfortunately happened following the
earthquake.
Chapter 3 recounts the earthquake and puts humanitarian aid theory into practice,
presenting particular instances of relief after the disaster in Internally Displaced Persons
(IDP) camps. The skewed characteristics of foreign aid impacted the livelihoods of
thousands of Haitians following the earthquake. An investigation of the United Nations
response to the disaster, focusing specifically upon Camp Management and Camp
Coordination, revealed the fallacies of the international community’s response and
reinforced a theoretical understanding of foreign aid as foreign policy.
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Chapter 4 concludes the body of this thesis with a crisis in Haiti created by
foreign aid. In October of 2010, months after the earthquake, a cholera epidemic spread
across the country, resulting in massive death tolls. However debilitating this disease
proved, the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene response exemplified an ironically hopeful
model for effective humanitarian relief. While only a specific instance, the recognition of
Haitian agency and capability in the response to cholera illuminated a promising
paradigm of foreign aid and the growing sovereignty of a historically dependent island
nation.
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CHAPTER 1
The History of Haiti from Revolution to the “Republic of NGOs”
Chapter Overview
A natural disaster, such as an earthquake, proves to be more than a single
catastrophic geologic event. It implicates human constructs in the ensuing destruction.
Historical, political, social, and economic processes that predate the disaster have a
significant impact on the scale and amount of damage incurred. These processes dictate
the vulnerability of a population to detrimental short-term and long-term effects. In
theory, a strong, stable state with well-developed infrastructure, a wealth of resources,
and a pre-established coordinated response should have the capability to sufficiently
prepare for and react to catastrophic events. Meanwhile, a weakened state ill prepared for
a “natural” disaster, lacking coordination, resources, and a response protocol, renders the
population significantly more susceptible to the destruction.
Unfortunately, Haiti falls within the latter category. Throughout its history, both
external and internal processes combined to reduce the small island country to a
defenseless population in the wake of a 7.0 magnitude earthquake in 2010. Internally,
cycles of weak, minimally democratic leadership and frequent military rule contributed to
the weakened state. Externally, colonialism, foreign occupation, and economic extraction
plagued the development of Haiti. Together, these processes hindered the establishment
of a sovereign, self-sufficient state capable of preventing and responding to a disaster.
Therefore, the history and processes anteceding a “natural” disaster foster an
understanding of the events and conditions following the event itself. Examining the
historical conditions within Haiti, this chapter contends that long-term patterns of
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colonialism, a legacy of slavery and internal challenges impacted how outside actors
viewed the country as a repository of humanitarian aid in the years to come. Thus, this
chapter ultimately argues that history established a cycle of dependency that necessitated
future continual humanitarian relief, aiding in an understanding of the aid response in the
aftermath of the earthquake.
This chapter begins in the late eighteenth century, addressing the slave rebellion
that began in 1791, as well as Haitian independence from France in 1804. This portion of
the country’s history proved pivotal in the following years, dictating Haiti’s place in the
global system characterized by inequalities, the ousting of a colonial power, and the
respective implementation of policies to usher in new economic and political precedents.
Next, the chapter will move into the early nineteenth century, years typified by both
internal and external difficulties. The state struggled to establish new internal systems.
Meanwhile, external foreign actors isolated the country whilst maintaining Haitian
dependence and subordination. The second-half of the century reinforced larger themes
and patterns of a weak, unstable, temporary state that encouraged foreign occupation and
economic extraction, this time on behalf of the United States. The chapter concludes in
the twentieth century with the “Duvalier Years”, characterized by the authoritarian rules
of Francois and Jean-Claude Duvalier. The cruelty and incapacity of these regimes
ultimately created the space for the arrival of foreign aid and services. The exploitation of
this space by foreign actors ultimately and rightfully led to the distinction of Haiti as the
“Republic of NGOs.” An understanding of Haitian history, laden with internal struggles
and external interventions, provided an imperative framework to contextualize the
earthquake of 2010 and the scale of disaster that ensued. This chapter unearths the
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tumultuous history of Haiti, to argue that central themes of weak leadership and domestic
capacity coupled with continued debilitating foreign intervention implicated historical
and social processes in a natural disaster and the aftermath of the earthquake.

Slave Rebellion and Haitian Independence
After initial Spanish conquest in 1492 and succeeding colonization, the territory
of Santo Domingo, present-day Haiti, came under French rule and was renamed SaintDomingue. As a French colony, Saint-Domingue offered a wealth of resources and labor
to Europe on behalf of its thriving plantation system, enabling the territory to ultimately
“become the most profitable colony in the world. By the late eighteenth century, it was
the world’s largest producer of sugar… and also grew fully half of the world’s coffee…”3
Saint-Domingue provided a lucrative export-based business for France. The French
dominated and benefited from the established economic system founded upon slavery.
These colonizers reaped the benefits of the rich resource and slave labor pool available.
Therefore, even prior to the existence of Haiti as an independent country, foreign powers
occupied the territory and executed a system of economic exploitation, impairing the
development of a sovereign Haiti. This dangerous precedent and history of colonialism
became entrenched in the economic and political systems of Haiti, reverberating effects
even after independence.
In particular, the plantation system while seeming to empower white French elites
simultaneously proved to be a rationale for resistance and uprising for Haitians against
French colonizers. The plantation system particularly swelled during the eighteenth
century, binding slaves to the land and establishing an engine for the production of goods
3

Laurent Dubois, Haiti: The Aftershocks of History (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2012), 19.
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such as coffee and sugar, tobacco, and indigo. The abundance of slavery in conjunction
with natural resources permitted the large-scale cultivation and exportation of goods for
French profit.4 However, despite the profit generated from this system, it also established
a dangerous social structure capable of strongly opposing colonizers and plantation
owners. A small consortium of white elites retained political, economic, and societal
power. Yet, slaves and free people of color constituted the majority of the population.
“Whites comprised fewer than 10 percent of the colony’s population (40,000 versus
approximately 500,000 slaves and 30,000 free people of color).”5 The awareness by
slaves of violations of human rights coupled with and advantage in numbers posed a
significant threat to the pre-existing plantation system. After the French Revolution,
knowledge spread of the “Rights of Man,” one of the main documents of the French
Revolution. This document ignited a revolutionary consciousness among the free black
and slave communities by stating that “men are born and remain equal in rights.”6
Therefore, this recognition established the framework for an overwhelming enemy in the
colored population of Saint-Domingue.7
With this framework, protests on the ground in Haiti, infused with tenets of the
French Revolution, instigated rebellions in Haiti. Beginning in 1791, free people of color
rose up advocating for their rights, leading the French government to extend the Rights of
Man to these constituencies and to eventually abolish slavery. Despite emancipation,
without gaining complete freedom from a plantation system and colonial rule, the black
4

Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution (United States: First
Harvard University Press, 2004), 18.
5
Alyssa Goldstein Sepinwall, Haitian History: New Perspectives (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 14.
6
Dubois, Avengers of the New World: the story of the Haitian Revolution, 77.
7
Under this system, attention must also be drawn to the racial prejudices. Enslavement set a precedent for
policy enacted with respect to the colored population. This precedent established a racial attitude that
percolated throughout future Haitian relationships with foreigners.
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population within Haiti mobilized yet again in hopes of achieving independence from
France in 1804. In response to continued plantation life after the slave rebellion, many
cultivators feared that this system could remain permanently. Thus, to avoid such a harsh
reality, the whole country became completely engulfed in war.8 The overwhelming effort
to expel French colonizers proved successful in 1804, when Saint-Domingue gained
independence as the new country of Haiti. However, the departure of the French left the
Haitian state and economic system completely vacated, a steep challenge for the new
country to undertake.
With regard to the state, disagreements ensued over the establishment of an
executive branch. The placement of the capital and the powers that ought to be vested in
the executive branch came under intense debate. Additionally, the country faced a
significant task in creating a new economic system after the dismantling of the plantation
system, a lucrative system for the export-based colony. Alyssa Sepinwall addresses these
concerns, and more, when saying “Haiti faced a triple challenge after the independence:
simultaneously founding a new state, reinserting itself into the international community
and establishing a new economic system to succeed slavery.”9 Therefore, for all its
triumphs, independence, much like emancipation, brought new challenges that would
plague Haitian development.
Unfortunately, the events that ensued in the wake of independence from France,
dictated countless consequences for Haiti in the years to come. First, as aforementioned,
Haiti could not immediately establish a strong state with democratic leadership.
Dissention also reigned over the creation of a new economic system. These internal

8
9

Robert Fatton, The Roots of Haitian Despotism (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc., 2007), 53.
Sepinwall, Haitian History: New Perspectives, 105.
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quarrels hindered the building of a new state and economic infrastructure after
independence. Too many questions and opportunities remained unfulfilled and
unanswered by Haiti. Further, relations with external actors, such as European countries
and the United States, only multiplied these domestic difficulties. Foreign powers in the
colonized world politically isolated the new country while also establishing a precedent
of economic dependence. With fear of similar insurgencies in their respective territories
and disapproval for the liberties granted to blacks, European countries as well as the
United States, refused to recognize Haitian independence. Economic policies towards
Haiti following independence supplemented the already weak foundation. Dependency
on foreign loans and the presence of foreign banks within Haiti hindered the development
of a monetarily secure and stable state. Therefore, moving forward after independence
was no clear, easy path. Haiti faced both internal and external challenges in founding new
systems. These challenges would haunt the advancement of Haitian society hundreds of
years later.

Early Nineteenth Century Haiti: Post-Independence Challenges
The beginning of the nineteenth century unfortunately brought numerous
difficulties for Haiti. The newly independent country encountered internal divisions over
the establishment of new systems, as well as external isolation from foreign countries and
the incursion of an indemnity from France. The country suffered from a weakened state
and economic system manipulated by foreign powers. Together, these challenges
hindered the stable development of a Haitian state. The consequences of such conditions
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rendered the country economically dependent on external actors, and thus vulnerable to
the demands of these respective powers as the century came to a close.
Internally, with the departure of French governance, Haiti gained an opportunity
to found a new political system; however, the freedom that accompanied independence
led to debilitating controversy among the population rather than to unifying and
empowering the country. With the departure of an emperor, the Haitians deemed a
democratic system with a parliament and president the ideal foundation for the newly
independent country.10 Yet while determining the details of this new system, two distinct
factions arose within Haiti, disputing the location of the new capital and the new
president. An official decision inaugurated Alexandre Pétion as the first president, a
candidate from Southern Haiti, but did not do so without initiating long-term dissention
within the country.11 The North and the South, supporting respectively different leaders
became distinctly demarcated. A population once unified to expel a colonial power was
now divided over the creation of a new state political system.
Debates over the political system created further distinctions between the rural
and urban citizens. With questions surrounding the future structure of governance, rural
citizens developed their own system.12 The Lakou system “developed largely in the
absence of- indeed opposition to- the Haitian government… rural residents… created an
egalitarian system without a state.”13 This rural model of society established both social
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and cultural practices with objectives to ensure autonomous land ownership as well as
equal access to freedom.14 As a result, the vacancy of a state after independence provided
the space and opportunity for a new unifying, democratic system. However, as the Lakou
system demonstrated, unification proved more difficult with the emergence of competing
systems, competition that unluckily ingrained unbridgeable classes amongst the Haitian
people.15 The creation and implementation of the Lakou system, then, established a new
distinct class in rural Haiti, a class that posed strong opposition to the urban dwellers who
attempted to create a national political system, only to be undermined by the competing
Lakou system. Soiled partitions now divided the population not only into Northern and
Southern factions, but also into urban and rural factions. More importantly, the Lakou
system displayed early examples of Haitian agency. Amidst an absent state, rural
residents took initiative to forge their own respective system of governance and
organization. Centuries removed from the present day, the Lakou system promoted a
communal network to respond to state inadequacy. A present recognition of this agency
and activity proves important as similar networks reemerged following the earthquake in
the absence of an effective state.
In addition to the Lakou system as a precedent of the forging of a new state in the
absence of what once existed, around this time, Haiti set another precedent that
established the nation’s export-driven economy. The dissention over the political future
of the country only grew with bitter disagreement over the economic system. Under
French rule, Saint-Domingue had thrived as an export-driven economy, deeply rooted in
plantations and slavery. For many, the expulsion of these colonizers then promised an
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end to bound labor. In particular, Haitian laborers desired a society with a respective
economy founded in the principles of the revolution, void of any human subjection.16
However, to Haitian elites, a continuation of the plantation system seemed the only viable
option for a sustained economy. To compete and succeed in the globalized, colonial
economy of the time, exportation of goods to foreign countries was a sure means of
staying afloat.17 As a result, many fervently fought against the termination of the
plantation system. Therefore, the opportunity for a redistribution of land and a re-creation
of the Haitian economy after independence proved counter-productive; state building and
the unification of the Haitian people evolved into internal tensions that only further
weakened the capacity of the new country. The domestic stagnation and divisions within
the country unfortunately became apparent, reinforcing an outward perception of Haiti as
an incapable state and ultimately encouraging foreign involvement.
In addition to the internal disagreements, Haiti faced difficulties from abroad,
combatting isolation from foreign powers. These foreign powers, in particular Britain and
the United States, feared the spread of revolution. Haiti served as “a powerful symbol of
black liberation, racial equality, a harbinger of African emancipation, and a beacon of
hope for the anti-slavery movement.”18 The Haitian revolution established a precedent of
granting freedoms to the enslaved, black population, a precedent that struck fear in
Britain and the United States. After independence, the racial anxiety associated with the
uprising in Haiti then had a definite influence on isolation policy. These countries feared
the spread of anti-slavery movements. Therefore, race remains an important lens through
which one can understand the country’s history.
16

Ibid., 104.
Sepinwall, Haitian History: New Perspectives, 105.
18
Ibid., 157.
17

26

The granting of such freedoms to the black population jeopardized economic as
well as social conditions for countries such as Britain and the United States.
Economically, emancipation threatened the plantation systems and extraction economies.
Socially, the values accompanying emancipation usurped social norms along racial lines.
Dubois explains the reaction of foreign actors to Haiti,
In decreeing a universal and immediate emancipation, [Haiti] created an example
that would be both celebrated and vilified, held up by some as a model of
uncompromising and principled action, and denounced by others as an example of
the dangers of giving liberty to slaves who were not ready to be freed.19
The denunciation came to fruition through the complete isolation of Haiti from
the global system and a common refusal to recognize the newly independent country. As
a result, Haiti quickly found itself on the periphery of world order. The shockwaves sent
around the world after the revolution and independence thus immediately placed Haiti in
a position of subordination and subsequent dependence on foreign powers.
Coupled with isolation, in order to establish a precedent of economic dependence
and further impair development, France imposed an indemnity upon Haiti as a
precondition for recognition of independence. “An indemnity was an elegant way of
solving the problem of political recognition: the country would remain free and
independent, but those who had been victims of its revolution would receive some form
of compensation.”20 Without rightful political reign over Haiti, an indemnity allowed
France to maintain control over the country through economic dominance. The
imposition of an indemnity left no room for compromise, but rather, assertively forced
the acceptance of such a document and respective dependence. One article of the
indemnity, in particular, debilitated Haiti for years to come, plummeting the country into
19
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debt and reliance on foreign loans as it “declared that Haitians would deposit in the
French treasury 150 million francs ‘to compensate the former colonists who request
indemnity’ for damaged or destroyed property.”21 With acquiescence and fulfillment of
the aforementioned articles “[France] concede[s] with this ordinance to the current
inhabitants of the French part of the island of Saint-Domingue the full and complete
independence of their government.”22 Thus, despite the expulsion of France from Haitian
territory, the country remained weakened by and subject to the demands of the previous
colonizers.
The reparations of the indemnity not only indebted the country to France but also
hindered any creation of domestic infrastructure. Haiti incurred a steep debt to France, so
steep, 150 million Francs, that the country was forced to take out massive loans from
foreign banks.23 After nearly eighty years, Haiti still had not repaid the full sum and the
French eventually took over the Haitian national bank in 1880, establishing the Banque
Nationale d’Haiti (BNH). “But the BNH was not really a national bank: it was a French
bank accountable to its French shareholders and not the Haitian people. This meant that
the Haitian government, unlike the governments of most other nations, did not have the
ability to set fiscal policy…”24 The inability of Haiti to initially pay off a 150 million
Franc indemnity began a cycle of economic dependence. After an initial loan, the
eventual abdication of a national bank to a foreign power robbed the Haitians of
autonomy over domestic economic initiatives. Further, as the country worked to pay off
the debt, money that could have been channeled to fund industry and infrastructure

21

Ibid., 99.
Dubois, Haiti: The Aftershocks of History, 99.
23
Today, 150 million Francs would be equivalent to approximately US $21 billion.
24
Ibid., 176.
22

28

instead flowed abroad, a process deemed the “castration of capital.”25 In fiscal terms this
meant that,
Year after year, Haiti’s population watched as money that could have been used to
build roads, ports, schools, and hospitals simply vanished. In 1838, according to
Victor Schoelcher, about 30 percent of Haiti’s total annual budget was spent
servicing the national debt...26
Thus, the indemnity severely debilitated the capacity of the Haitian government
and people to build state infrastructure and a sovereign economy. Accepting loans from
multiple global actors in concordance with the inability to strengthen domestically put the
country in a vulnerable position. This vulnerability soon opened the way for more
involvement of foreign actors and foreign policies meddling in domestic affairs in the
second half of the nineteenth century. Independence in Haiti was then a far cry from true
liberation.

Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century: United States Foreign Occupation
Internal challenges during the beginning of the nineteenth century rendered Haiti
vulnerable to foreign intervention. Constant internal upheaval created a platform for
external activity within Haiti. Domestically, insurrection and political change plagued the
country during the middle and late 1800s. In fact, with respect to this time period, many
scholars apply the term “kleptocracy” to describe the frequent turn over of power that
occurred with transient military regimes. Suffering through a seemingly constant civil
war, “between 1843 and 1889, there were twelve presidents and nearly as many
constitutions… Almost always the changes in government came as a result of a military
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campaign in which the president was ousted by a rebel at the hand of a regional army.”27
Thus, with each new change in government promised to fulfill the demands of only a
regional constituency, the succeeding regime and respective constitution served a portion
of the population. In failing to be the result of a national consensus, each military rule,
however initially encouraging, was only to fall to a subsequent coup. Unfortunately, this
detrimental cycle inhibited the building of the Haitian state.
In a transition from French to US foreign occupation, the United States used
internal corruption and racist notions of a black state to justify intervention. The United
States identified and manipulated Haitian political instability in order to establish an
indirect power in the former colony. To begin this changeover from French colonialism
to American imperialism, the United States disregarded prior isolation policy and
recognized Haitian independence in 1862. However, this sovereignty did not persist.
Under the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904, the United States reserved the right to intervene
in neighboring countries to ensure a “stable, orderly, and prosperous” country.28
Observing the “kleptocracy” in Haiti during the late 1800s, as well as the succession of
seven different presidents between 1911 and 1915, the United States turned its attention
to the seemingly needy Haiti. Thus, the United States used Haitian corruption as a
justification for subsequent occupation.
However, such a rationale for occupation only masked self-serving political and
economic motives, motives that robbed the independent country of is very sovereignty.
At the turn of the century, the United States felt pressure to compete with foreign
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colonizers such as France, Britain, and Spain.29 To compete meant to colonize and one of
the few independent countries remaining was Haiti. Thus, in August of 1915, Woodrow
Wilson deemed Haiti “incapable of self-governance” and occupied the country.30 The
United States may have further grounded this perception of Haiti as unfit for government
on behalf race. Not only was the majority of the population black, but also, prior to
occupation, Haitian presidents were black. Occupation then maintained possible racial
undertones and worked to further exclude the black race from positions of governance.
Thus, internal upheaval coupled with neo-colonial rule during the second half of the
nineteenth century established a precedent that permitted the presence of foreign actors
and subverted the development of the Haitian state and economy. The United States
gratefully, but not rightfully, accepted the responsibilities of the Haitian state, instilling
policies compatible with American rather than Haitian interests. This occupation
hindered the development of Haiti, creating conditions for future involvement and
fortifying colonial dependence.
First, during occupation, the United States further thwarted the maturation and
building of a sustainable Haitian economy. The Haitian economy, already in a vulnerable
state, thus became increasingly inefficient and incapable of capacity building. First, the
United States imposed new agricultural practices. These new methods failed to respect
the local environment and context. New techniques introduced by the United States did
not align with traditional planting or agricultural programs.31 For example, the corporate
production of cotton, pineapples, and other products did not account for the restrictions
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on land or water use characteristic of the region.32 This imperial naivety characterized
American economic policy in Haiti and revealed a lack of local knowledge and a sense of
cultural superiority that justified an imposition of unsuitable, and thus largely
unsuccessful agricultural production methods. Further, this policy altered pre-established,
functioning labor systems. The United States formed banana plantations for export and its
own economic gain. However, these plantations disrupted small-scale informal peasant
economies. Under the guise of American agricultural systems, previously independent
farmers became field laborers to a “foreign master.”33 Therefore, not only did profit flow
to a foreign power, but that foreign power also debilitated the local economy through the
application of disjunctive policy and agricultural practices. Haiti suffered from policies
that did not provide answers to a question of the future sustainability of the country’s
economy. As a result Haiti relinquished economic independence to the United States, an
abdication that ultimately crippled internal governance structures and institutions.
Further, with respect to the state, the United States imposed legislation,
undermining and annulling the governing power of Haitian political institutions. In 1917,
the Haitian legislature rejected a document drafted by the United States State Department
to serve as the basis for a constitution. This rejection spurred a twelve-year suspension on
behalf of the United States of that respective legislative body.34 Thus, the United States
effectively dismembered a Haitian political body, hindering the development not only of
legislation, but also of the state itself. Further, the United States declared martial law in
Haiti, implanting U.S. Marines in positions traditionally held by local administrators. The
Marines accepted responsibilities with respect to tax collection, public works, and
32
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judicial affairs.35 Therefore, in addition to suspending Haitian political bodies, the United
States replaced Haitian administrators. While the United States maintained clear political
and economic justifications for intervention, ideological justifications influenced
intervention as well. These ideologies, rooted in race, undermined the capabilities of the
ruling black population, thus calling for American replacements in previously black roles
in Haiti. An understanding of Haitian history then explains the justifications of foreign
occupation and the long-term patterns of intervention in various forms. The United States
occupation further incapacitated the Haitian state. The policies and personnel
incorporated in occupation hindered the nation’s development. Accusations of
“kleptocracy” justified occupation, which only hindered the development of the state,
necessitating repeated foreign intervention. A vicious cycle had been created.
Thus, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, foreign intervention
and interests undermined the work of a previously colonized country to gain political and
economic sovereignty. The occupation by the United States promoted American interests,
with little regard for those of Haiti. This approach not only set a precedent of foreign
intervention with seemingly justified motives, but also provided space for foreign actors
to inhabit space of the Haitian state on political, economic, and ideological platforms for
subjective benefit. In doing so, Haiti could not advance or develop as a nation. Rather,
the country was subject to foreign demands, thus creating debilitating conditions of
internal incapability that only furthered a cycle of Haitian domestic weakness and foreign
abuse. All in all, integration of American policy in Haiti allowed for the country to
maintain a foothold and significant control for years to come.
The Early Duvalier Years: Authoritarian Rule and the Arrival of NGOs 1957-1972
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With time, the United States’ regime in Haiti no longer stood unopposed. Haitians
no longer associated progress with American-imposed political and economic systems.
These systems evoked antipathy towards the United States particularly amongst the rural
peasant population that suffered the consequences of an unsuitable economic system.
Moreover, the general Haitian population shared a frustration over feeling a loss of
sovereignty with foreign occupation.36 This exasperation galvanized dissent, sparking
several protests and strikes across the country throughout the 1920s. Such demonstrations
successfully expelled the Marines, and respectively, ended United States occupation of
Haiti in 1934.37 However, despite initial optimism for democratic self-rule,
authoritarianism and violence marked the succeeding years of Haitian history. From
1957-1986, Francois Duvalier and his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier led regimes of violent,
forceful political repression. Under the Duvalier regimes, Haiti continued to confront
ineffective and unconstitutional rule, only reinforcing the precedent of a weak, incapable
state. The government became repressive, unengaged, uninvolved, and disregarded the
welfare of the population. As a result, the Duvalier years came to a close with the mass
arrival of foreign actors disapproving of the abuses of the inhumane and irresponsible
Haitian state.38 The arrival of these foreign actors displayed a theme throughout the
country’s history of intervention, and fortified the vulnerable position of Haiti in the
global system. Undermining of the Haitian state not only disempowered this already
weak body, but also continued to impede capacity building inherent to the prevention of a
repeated cycled of both internal and external abuse.
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Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier came to power in 1957 and immediately
established a dictatorial regime, distancing Haiti further from the possibility of a
democratic rule and the external respect that accompanies such democracy. Upon coming
to power, Duvalier created a paramilitary force to suppress opposition, as well as
centralize and expand executive power. Francois Duvalier, a keen student of Haitian
history, recognized that his predecessors consistently lost power to some form of a
military coup. Therefore, even prior to election, Duvalier created a private paramilitary
force to carry out violent raids to repress his adversaries.39 In particular, Duvalier used
this force to “[imprison], torture, murder and exile to silence his opponents, and the
armed forces were neutralized from the outset.”40 Domination even extended beyond
these means to include “… martial law, dusk-to-dawn curfews, press censorship…” in
order to fortify his leadership.41 Thus, Francois Duvalier established a violent regime,
suppressing any and all challenges to his authority. Such leadership proved to only
further weaken, rather than strengthen the Haitian state, a state still searching for a strong
democratic solution to years of colonialism and foreign intervention.
Further, with respect to executive power, Duvalier enacted a new constitution in
1957, granting himself and his government mechanisms to ensure almost total control.
According to Dubois, the new constitution “expanded the government’s right to declare a
state of siege: Duvalier could now do so not only in the case of foreign invasion but also
in response to ‘civil disturbances’ within the country.”42 Civil disturbances served as a
loose term, easily manipulated to further the ends of the government. Therefore, the
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ability to declare a state of siege with respect to “civil disturbances” equipped the
government with an uncontested capability to suspend Haitians’ political and civil rights.
This power granted Duvalier almost complete authority over Haitian citizens. Such a
change to the constitution hindered Haiti’s achievement of a long desired democratic
political system. Moreover, violations of human rights that characterized this period of
Haitian history proved detrimental to the place of Haiti in the geopolitical world order
and attracted continued attention from foreign actors. This attention would only be
heightened by the succeeding rule of his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier, beginning in 1971.

Chapter Conclusion
Haitian history displayed a legacy of colonialism and slavery, foreign
intervention, economic and political dependency, internal corruption, and authoritarian
leaders. These patterns and themes ultimately coincided to hinder the development of
Haiti as a sovereign nation. First, after independence, the country failed to recover from
French colonization. Politically, Haiti never established a democratic system under strong
leadership. Economically, Haiti did not efficiently or effectively establish an alternative
to the plantation system. Moreover, frequent military regimes and turnovers of power
plagued the country, hindering any sense of continuity or empowerment. Such trends
permeated almost every regime that came to power throughout Haitian history. The
unfortunate perpetuation of these themes established a weak state, which was used by
foreign actors as a justification for frequent intervention.
Foreign actors did not hesitate to exploit these political, economic, and
ideological vulnerabilities of Haiti. France created space for such exploitation of Haiti
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through the imposition of an indemnity and the subsequent incursion of Haitian debt.
This indemnity degraded Haiti to a position of economic independence, allowing other
powers to establish footholds in the country. The United States in particular, abused such
footholds, taking over where France left off, heavily meddling in Haitian affairs. During
occupation in the twentieth century, the United States undermined any responsibilities or
legitimacy of the Haitian state and economy, creating conditions that countered any
movement toward sovereignty and autonomy. Thus, these patterns hindered the building
of the capacity of the state and the strengthening of internal infrastructure. Foreign
intervention exploited such conditions, inundating the country during the late twentieth
century under Jean-Claude Duvalier, beginning a new republic in Haiti, a “Republic of
NGOs.”
Thus, this chapter argued that foreign intervention as well as weak internal
leadership and corruption permeated Haitian history and state building. Going forward,
this understanding of Haitian history is imperative to understanding the humanitarian
relief effort in the aftermath of the earthquake. Throughout history, foreign powers
manipulated Haitian politics and economics by intervening in domestic policy. As a
result, on January 11, 2010, the lack of a sovereign state and economic infrastructure
hindered the ability of Haiti to execute an effective response to the 7.0 magnitude
earthquake. The quake both literally and figuratively leveled the Haitian government.43
With physical infrastructure damage as well as the damage of two hundred years of
history, “helping is difficult in a broken and under funded system.”44 After the disaster,
without strong central leadership or well-established resources, the state proved incapable
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of an immediate coordinate rescue effort. A state without sovereignty and autonomy
cannot sufficiently establish internal protocols or infrastructure, accrue sufficient
resources, or coordinate efficiently amongst varying actors involved in the state. Thus,
the correlation between Haitian history and the extent of damage from the earthquake
suggests that “natural” disasters are not merely a single event, but calls into question the
roots of the disaster, found in historical and societal processes.45 In Haiti, human
constructs exaggerated the destruction incurred by tectonic activity. The cycles of
economic dependence, foreign intervention, and a weak state lacking sovereignty
established human-made inequalities that rendered the country highly vulnerable to
destruction as a result of manmade causes. Haiti’s history reveals that the global
inequalities and dependencies established as a result of long-term historical processes are
then highly implicated in environmental issues.
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CHAPTER 2
The Republic of NGOs: Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy
Chapter Overview
In Chapter One, this thesis argued that the history of Haiti provided imperative
insight necessary to later understand the earthquake and its aftermath. This chapter
continues that theme by focusing upon a particular period in Haiti’s recent past that
exhibited foreign intervention through the emergence of an unprecedented number of
foreign actors and aid groups. The Haitian proverb sak vid pa kanp translates to “an
empty sack cannot stand up.” Plagued by debilitating internal leadership and external
intervention, the Haitian state was all but an empty sack, incapable of performing basic
functions and responsibilities for its population. Recognizing this incapability, foreign
actors once again descended upon the country to fill the gaps of the weakened state.
However, this time, prior to the turn of the twenty-first century, foreign intervention
promoted a different image. Justifying their arrival with philanthropic, humanitarian
motives, external actors entered Haiti in the form of aid organizations, flooding the
country at unmatched rates and in unheard of quantities. This complete inundation soon
garnered Haiti the title, the “Republic of NGOs.” This chapter explores the continued
foreign intervention within Haiti in conjunction with a theoretical exploration of aid and
humanitarian organizations, arguing that the arrival of massive amounts of foreign aid
characteristic of the Republic of NGOs shaped the conditions of Haiti after the
earthquake and further perpetuated a state of dependence.
Without an effective state, NGOs became service providers. Humanitarian aid
organizations brought along a patchwork of needed goods for the neglected Haitian
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population.46 Providing potable water, food, shelter, education, and medicine, an
overwhelming number of NGOs filled the spaces left behind by an incapable state.
Therefore, towards the end of the twentieth century, the host of foreign actors involved in
the satisfaction of Haitian needs brought about a “golden age” of NGO activity.
Humanitarian aid organizations compensated for the shortcomings and inabilities that
plagued the Haitian state. However, the underbelly of humanitarian aid reveals that the
power to do harm accompanies the power to do good.47
The first part of this chapter continues an analysis of Haitian history, showing the
internal turmoil within the country, and the global policies influencing the domestic
milieu. This chapter opens amidst another dictatorial rule under the second Duvalier
regime, in 1972. Jean-Claude Duvalier not only resumed the state terror that marked the
years of Haiti under his father, Francois Duvalier, but also encouraged foreign investment
and the involvement of external actors in the provision of services to Haitian citizens.
Coupled with executive fraud and a consequential redirection of foreign activity around
the government, these developments marked the initial steps toward the creation of a
“Republic of NGOs.”
This chapter then examines the rise of neoliberalism in Haiti, a global policy that
furthered these initial steps activated by the Duvalier regime. Neoliberalism influenced
the way in which the world was connected, transforming relationships among global
actors and the forms of aid. This policy particularly affected underdeveloped countries
throughout the world, such as Haiti. Neoliberal policy realigned the priorities of the state,
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neglecting previous responsibilities. As a result, foreign actors entered Haiti under a new
pre-text and identity: as philanthropic, humanitarian actors. However, the seemingly
altruistic deliverance of goods and services through humanitarian actors simultaneously
further entrenched global inequalities and prejudices, particularly impairing countries
such as Haiti. Thus, the introduction of neoliberalism marked a major turning point in the
conditions of Haiti that predate January 12, 2010.48
The last part of this chapter culminates with an analysis of these new actors,
NGOs, first in a general context of foreign aid and then within the context of NGO theory
under the “Republic of NGOs.” An initial exploration of foreign aid reveals the
politicization of humanitarian aid. Foreign aid can often be synonymous with foreign
policy. Patterns in the allocation of aid display that while foreign actors promote altruistic
motives, they never remain immune to the influence of foreign policy, subjective
motives, and cultural or political ideologies. This section initially speaks generally to
foreign aid. Yet, a subsequent, specific focus upon foreign aid within Haiti during the
Republic of NGOs suggests that botched systems of aid proved detrimental to the country
in the long run. The prioritization of foreign benefits over Haitian needs undermined the
building of Haitian capacity and sovereignty.
Further, a specific focus upon NGO theory reveals the discrepancies that exist
between the theory and the practice of humanitarian aid deliverance, discrepancies
implicated in the aftermath of the earthquake. Unfortunately, the incongruity between
ideal and actual forms of aid undermines two central characteristics of humanitarian
service provision: downward accountability and the incorporation of local participation.
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Deviance from the accountability to, and incorporation of, the local community in
humanitarian activity holds significant consequences for the receiving communities.
Haiti, a country overwhelmed by aid organizations at the end of the twentieth century,
experienced an exaggeration of the consequences of such discrepancies between theory
and practice. Unluckily, these detrimental effects of humanitarianism further encouraged
the geopolitical exclusion of Haiti.

The Late Duvalier Years: The Establishment of the “Republic of NGOs”
Since the revolution, weak leadership, an unstable state, and foreign intervention
plagued the development of Haiti. The combination of these long-term processes and
patterns with circumstances immediately predating the establishment of a “Republic of
NGOs,” encouraged the arrival of humanitarian aid organizations towards the end of the
twentieth century. This process began under the regime of Francois “Papa-Doc”
Duvalier. Throughout his rule from 1957-1971, Francois Duvalier consolidated an state
power. However, this authority derived from political violence rather than through the
ability of the state to serve the welfare needs of its people.49 As mentioned in Chapter
One, torture, murder, and exile dominated political activity rather than service provision.
Harsh conditions and state policy garnered attention from abroad as foreign powers
observed Duvalier’s human rights violations.
The subsequent policies under the second Duvalier regime transformed previous
foreign attention upon Haiti into actual intervention within the country. However this
time, foreign involvement took a new form. With the sudden passing of Francois
Duvalier in 1971, his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier followed the precedent set by his father
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of violent political oppression. The amount of Haitians exiled, put in prison, and tortured
increased significantly under the second Duvalier regime.50 In addition, Jean-Claude
Duvalier suspended the constitutional guarantees of citizens, centralizing state and
executive power. Foreign actors had a heightened awareness of the human rights
violations within Haiti.
This awareness developed into involvement when Duvalier invited foreign
investment into Haiti. With this invitation, external actors jumped at the opportunity to
provide economic assistance to the Haitian citizenry. “The amount of aid that came into
Haiti during the Jean-Claude Duvalier years was staggering: between 1972 and 1981
alone it amounted to $584 million…”51 Two main foreign actors answered Duvalier’s call
for investment, the first of which were foreign governments. The United States in
particular funded 80% of the aid flowing into Haiti, despite knowledge of the atrocities of
the Duvalier regime.52 This aid most often took the form of grants or loans intended for
economic support or development assistance.53 Meanwhile, NGOs, INGOs and other
organizations provided significant financial support, including “the World Bank, the IDB,
the UN Development Program, the World Food Program, the FAO, the World Health
Organization, the Organization for American States, the Inter-American Institute for
American States, the Inter-American Institute for Agricultural Cooperation, and about
130 private non-governmental organizations…”54 NGOs entering Haiti included small
agencies such as the Armenian Church Association or the Taiwan International
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Cooperation and Development Fund, as well as larger international agencies such as the
Red Cross, CARE, Habitat for Humanity, and Partners in Health, to name a few.
Organizations initially channeled donor money and aid through the government to
provide basic services neglected by the Duvalier regime, such as access to clean water,
electricity, education, as well as food and agricultural security.55 Thus, towards the end of
the 1970s external actors took significant initial steps of involvement in Haiti through aid
and service provision, establishing footholds for external actors in the creation of a
parallel state, a “Republic of NGOs”.
However, the Duvalier regime selfishly exploited the influx of foreign money to
commit extravagant fraud, rerouting aid around the government, and further establishing
a parallel welfare state. It became apparent “that Duvalier and his associates were simply
taking much of the official aid money sent to the country for their own private gain.”56
Foreign governments, aware of this misappropriation, continued to channel aid money
through Duvalier. For the United States, a significant supplier of donor money, Haiti
provided a large market for U.S. products, and the diversion of aid around the
government threatened this lucrative economic opportunity.57 As a result, the subsequent
financial institutions controlled by the United States similarly continued to provide
funding for Haiti directly through the government.58
However, NGOs observing the fraudulent activity of the Duvalier regime did not
hesitate to redirect aid donations around the state, an important step in the creation of a
“Republic of NGOs”. By bypassing the state, NGOs slowly came to embody one of the
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many roles of state government.59 As a result, in the late 1970s and early 1980s donors
began to channel money primarily through “private voluntary organizations, or PVOs,
which now largely go under the name of non-governmental organizations.”60 Unlike
donor governments, these aid organizations did not rely on Haiti for economic or political
gain, and thus could bypass the state without any detrimental ramifications. Therefore,
the re-direction of money through non-governmental, private groups rather than public
avenues respectively routed aid around the government. These agencies adopted the
responsibility of ensuring for the wellbeing of the impoverished and suffering Haitian
population through service provision, ultimately taking on the role of the state. For
example, food donations, previously filtered through the government, now entered Haiti
as $500,000 worth of foodstuffs each year via the Catholic Relief Services.61 Thus, the
practices of the Duvalier regime altered the identity of foreign involvement in the
country, ushering in an inundation of non-governmental organizations delivering
humanitarian aid. Throughout the regime of Jean-Claude Duvalier, this alteration worked
to further the creation of a parallel state within Haiti and a “Republic of NGOs.”
Eventually, the fraudulent acts of Jean-Claude Duvalier terminated his regime in
1986, but not without continuing the legacy of weak Haitian leadership, further
undermining the development of the state and initiating the creation of a “Republic of
NGOs.” Continual disregard for the rights and wellbeing of the population throughout his
dictatorship called for and justified the intervention of humanitarian aid agencies. The
continuation of executive money laundering, despite significant allocation of money
59
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through private organizations, undermined economic development plans. Recognition by
the Haitian population of the deterioration of economic conditions within the country led
to a series of strikes and youth demonstrations that ultimately forced Jean-Claude
Duvalier to flee in February, 1986.62 Duvalier left behind a state that had regressed rather
than progressed under his rule and his father’s rule. By the time it ended, the Duvalier
regime had created the ideal conditions for the arrival of foreign actors. This regime
ultimately turned significant state responsibilities over to financial institutions, foreign
governments, and NGOs to create a parallel “Republic of NGOs.”

A Global Framework in the Late Twentieth Century: Neoliberalism
The internal conditions particularly prevalent under the regime of Jean-Claude
Duvalier established the space for, and initial role of, humanitarian organizations within
Haiti. Meanwhile, external forces and policies further created the room and need for aid
agencies within Haiti. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s globalization and a subsequent
form of globalization, neoliberalism, spread throughout the world, infiltrating countries
within Latin America and the Caribbean, such as Haiti. Globalization and neoliberalism
altered global connections and the flow of goods, ideas, and actors.63 In particular, actors
such as NGOs became increasingly participatory in new networks, accepting
responsibility for government welfare activities. With the entrance of non-governmental
organizations, Haiti became a testing ground for a model of development emerging
towards the end of the twentieth century facilitated by foreign actors. Thus, in Haiti, the
infiltration of neoliberalism further entrenched the need for aid and donor agencies.
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Globalization is not a contemporary phenomenon as global relations predate the
current age. As Chapter One demonstrated, colonialism and imperialism are just a few of
the processes throughout history that superseded spatial limitations and boundaries.
These processes established initial global inequalities and geopolitical domination,
consequences that permeated succeeding forms of globalization. Globalization of the late
twentieth century represented yet another, contemporary form of worldwide relations.
International, external, and non-territorial politics began to transcend prior domestic,
internal, and territorial conventional concepts.64 Countries like Haiti became increasingly
woven into transnational relationships, serving as a laboratory for foreign political,
economic, and social endeavors, one of these noteworthy paradigms being neoliberalism.
As a result, Haiti suffered the consequences of geopolitical domination that affected the
conditions within the country for succeeding years.
Across territorial boundaries and varying applications, neoliberal policy modified
the characteristics of connections and relationships amongst global actors. Held and
McGrew articulate these evolutions as,
A growth in communication, economic, and political connections within and
across states and regions… that there has been an expansion in the number and
role of intergovernmental organizations, international non-governmental
organizations, and social movements in regional and global affairs.65
To affect global modifications, neoliberalism changed economic, political, and
social paradigms.66 Neoliberal policy achieved such changes by striving for economic
efficiency on behalf of a few main principles: privatization, economic liberalization, and
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state deregulation. Neoliberal ideals first appeared in the 1940s and 1950s, but did not
take effect in global policy until thirty years later.67 Fully entering the world stage in the
1970s, neoliberal policy altered preexisting networks and relations established by
globalization.
Neoliberalism infiltrated Latin America and the Caribbean as a new extensity of
global networks brought this policy to wider regions of the world. In particular, in the
early 1990s, Haiti felt increasing external pressure from dominant world powers to
subsume and conform to neoliberal policy. After the departure of Duvalier, Haiti
abdicated significant power to International Financial Institutions (IFIs).68 Haiti suffered
from an informal contractual relationship with these institutions, “As a condition for their
support, the International Financial Institutions insisted that [the president] follow the
neoliberal economic doctrine.”69 Moreover, in 1994, the United States aided in the return
of former elected-president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. However, stipulations accompanied
this return, as President Clinton required that Aristide accept strict neoliberal reforms.70
Under such pressure from both IFIs, and the United States, Aristide “acquiesced to a
program of structural adjustment designed by the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund” causing the “modernization of public enterprise.”71 Thus, neoliberal
theory began to affect Haitian policy in the early 1990s, and subsequently realigned the
roles of the state under Aristide, as a result of privatization, economic liberalization, and
state deregulation of the country.
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Privatization addressed a shift in the market from the public to a private domain.
The perceived increased efficiency of the private over the public sector justified such a
shift.72 As a result, neoliberalism “[assigned] clear, legally enforceable, private property
rights to hithero unowned, government owned or communally owned aspects of the
social and natural worlds.”73 These privatizations particularly occurred Haiti in 1995.
Acquiescing to foreign demands in order to continue to receive aid, Aristide agreed to the
privatization of nine previously state-run enterprises.74 Specifically, the United States
identified the state-owned companies in Haiti of flour and cement products as significant
impediments to economic efficiency.75 Thus, this foreign power advocated for
privatization of these industries and the movement from a public to a private domain.
Unfortunately, this neoliberal shift undermined the role and responsibilities of the Haitian
state.
Further, neoliberalism entailed the process of economic liberalization, enabling
the free movement of goods and services throughout an unregulated market. As a result,
both producers and consumers enjoyed respective freedoms, “producers are portrayed as
being ‘free’ to deliver goods and services at a competitive price… consumers,
meanwhile, are portrayed by neoliberals as equally ‘free’ to determine from which
producers they buy which commodities.”76 In Haiti, taxes on products drastically
decreased, to 0 to 3 percent on staple goods and half of the total goods moved through the
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Haitian market duty free.77 The Haitian market became one of the most “open” markets
throughout the world, encouraging an untethered flow of goods. As a result, foreign
countries exploited this liberalization, inundating the country with external goods,
weakening the Haitian domestic economy, and buttressing preexisting global inequalities.
Finally, neoliberal policy caused a movement towards state deregulation. This
meant the “diminution of government intervention in certain areas of social and
environmental life.”78 Thus, as governments conformed to neoliberalism, the role of the
state underwent significant change. A common misunderstanding associates the changing
state role with a “state rollback.” However, neoliberalism did not diminish or curtail state
power and government, but rather altered the spheres through which the state exercised
power.79 With a greater focus on market provision and economic efficiency, the state
maintained a lesser focus on the provision of public goods and services.80 This shift
reconfigured “state/governmental policies so as to extend the frontiers of privatization
and marketizations. Here then, the state in its various forms became a ‘market
manager’… and less of a ‘provider’ to the citizenry or special interests therein…”81 The
state abandoned its role and responsibility as a welfare state, abdicating much of this
power to the private sector. This shift is often viewed as a “degovernmentalization” of the
welfare state.82 Thus, neoliberalism did not necessarily debunk or erase the state. Rather,
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this policy affected new limits on state actions and transferred state responsibility to a
new set of external actors, NGOs.
In the relocation of state responsibility a new set of external actors entered and
modified global networks and connections. Humanitarian aid agencies inhabited the
space vacated by the state as a result of “degovernmentalization.” Neoliberal policy
outsourced functions of the state as, “the social and regulatory operations of the state are
increasingly ‘destatized’, taken over by a proliferation of ‘quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organizations.’”83 As a result, the worldwide community experienced an
increase in the quantity of aid organizations between 1990 and 1998 from 6,000
organizations to nearly 60,000 organizations.84 Moreover, an increase in funding
mirrored the increase in aid organizations; NGOs became the preferential means through
which governments and donors channeled money. Gaining traction and recognition as
effective vehicles of aid and change, “it is estimated that NGOs channeled anywhere
from $3.7 billion to $7.8 billion of humanitarian assistance, and $24 billion in overall
development funding.”85 Thus, through the space provided by neoliberal reforms,
humanitarian aid organizations entered into global networks, becoming responsible for
the well being of civil society.
Haiti displayed neoliberalism in action. The arrival and implementation of a
neoliberal doctrine stimulated foreign intervention in Haiti, in the form of humanitarian
aid and NGOs. With an initial wave of international agencies entering the country under
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Duvalier, the implementation of neoliberal policy only increased the quantity of the
preexisting organizations. After the return of Aristide to power and the subsequent
enactment of neoliberalism, “foreign NGOs began springing up all over the country,
creating a patchwork and sporadic delivery of basic services to Haitian people…”86 As a
result, services previously run by the state, came under the realm of NGO governance.
These services included the provision of food, medicine, shelter, education, and clean
water, to name a few. For example, “80 percent of the schools and 90 percent of the
clinics were run by NGOs.”87 Non-governmental organizations exemplified a powerful
alternative to the state, ensuring the wellbeing of Haitian citizens.88 Hence, despite the
overwhelming presence of NGOs, these humanitarian aid agencies performed important
roles, doing a significant amount of good in a weakened and impoverished country. Yet,
despite providing necessary services and goods, these new foreign actors were not
immune to skewed self-interests and motivations.

Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy
Towards the end of the twentieth century with the implementation of
neoliberalism, foreign intervention in Haiti took on a new form. Humanitarian aid
became the leading form of foreign intervention, deviating from previous forms including
colonialism, imperialism, and military occupation. This time, foreign actors arrived in
Haiti on behalf of relief. However, despite these commendable motives, the governments,
banks, and non-governmental organizations within Haiti often deviated from such
86
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altruism. A politicization of foreign aid recognized the unfortunate reality that original
country or regional ideologies and political beliefs often influenced the providers of aid,
non-governmental organizations. These actors maintained either direct or indirect
relationships with governments in developed countries allocating foreign aid funds and
resources. For example, donors simultaneously doubled as political actors. Moreover,
organizations received funding from political institutions. These links between aid
providers and government agencies impacted the approach through which actors worked,
influencing where actors carried out projects, which projects they chose to enact, and
how they framed their work.
Non-governmental organizations often implement economic or political
development projects in underdeveloped countries. However, these projects tend to be
funded by the governments of developed countries, influencing the particular identities of
development projects. Therefore, one must ask, whom does foreign aid serve? Through a
critical analysis, it seems as if foreign aid represents a form of foreign policy, serving as
an arm for political motivations and subjective benefits of developed nations and their
respective governments. The United States proved to be a common culprit of this
manipulation of aid. Within Haiti, foreign actors and NGOs were not immune to these
biased systems of aid, distortions that held grave consequences for the capabilities of the
country at the time of the earthquake.
Prior to this instance of foreign aid within Haiti, connections and networks among
global actors established a precedent that foreign aid served as a means by which actors
could accomplish their interests. Private interests of developed nations came to the
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forefront of the global political landscape.89 First, during a time of rapid decolonization
from 1945-1981, superpowers used foreign aid as a means to incorporate newly
independent states into their respective spheres of control.90 Further, during the Cold
War, foreign aid continued to reflect donor interests to either foster or deter the spread of
communism.91 In particular, the United States and the Communist Bloc competed to
extend corresponding ideologies and political doctrines. For example, the United States
“threw billions to… lure [countries] into an anti-communist camp.”92 With the end of the
Cold War, motivations for foreign aid changed once again, this time with a less
competitively driven justification. Instead, during the 1990s foreign aid promoted
development by supporting economic and political transitions, addressing global
problems, furthering democracy, and managing conflict.93 Trends of foreign aid during
this time respectively reflected this prioritization of development aid as “the distribution
of aid during this period titled toward the poorest countries, rising from just over 10
percent of total aid in 1970 to 25 percent a decade later.”94 This trend interestingly
coincided with the rise of neoliberal development schemes emerging around the
conclusion of the Cold War. As a result, these new goals encouraged foreign aid to focus
upon primarily poor, underdeveloped countries like Haiti, struggling with political and
economic stability. Haiti as a “Republic of NGOs” displayed this focus, saturated by non-
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governmental organizations promoting the growth of civil society and government
infrastructure. However, despite this hopeful provision of development aid, the end of the
twentieth century brought criticism and skepticism of foreign aid. Recognition spread that
donors seemed to make foreign aid decisions without adherence to the preferences of the
intended beneficiaries.95 This criticism unveiled the failures of foreign aid experienced by
Haitians under the Republic of NGOs.
An analysis of the actors making foreign aid decisions reveals that foreign policy
influences humanitarian aid allocations. First, governments provide significant funding
for foreign aid programs. With this financial influence, political institutions obtain
control over foreign aid decisions. Institutions determine “who sets the issue agenda, who
has access to decision-makers, who decides policies, and who can veto decisions.”96
Consequently, institutional space exists for political ideologies or motives to infiltrate
into foreign aid discussions and allocations. As previously mentioned, in the 1900s, the
governments of developed countries served as the leaders of foreign aid allocations.
During this time, the United States and Japan provided the greatest quantity of foreign
aid, followed by a host of Western European countries including, but not limited to,
Britain, Sweden, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, and Finland.97 Second, NGOs maintain
similar biased impulses. These organizations maintain cultural or religious affinities, as
well as commercial, or agricultural interests. Moreover, government policies and leaders
can influence NGOs. Some NGOs maintain informal alliances with government
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agencies.98 These alliances can take many forms. On one hand, governments provide
funding for NGOs, particularly those specializing in humanitarian relief.99 An exemplary
illustration of this relationship exists between USAID and United States NGOs. USAID,
the United States Agency for International Development channels a noteworthy portion
of its funding through these NGOs.100 As a donor, USAID, a government agency, can
then influence aid decisions. Thus, foreign aid becomes an extension of foreign policy,
manipulated by government dogmas.
Further, the flows and direction of aid reveal that humanitarian actions are
influenced by geo-political strategies. Ideally, “if aid is to be allocated on the basis of
recipient needs, the poorest countries should receive more, and the richest countries
less.”101 However, this ideal allocation fails to be actualized. The countries of China and
India serve as contradictory examples to this ideal. Both China and India display
conditions imploring for an overwhelming arrival of aid with high levels of poverty and
very large populations. Yet, these countries receive infrequent commitments of foreign
aid.102 Therefore, there exists some ulterior motivation to shift the just appropriation of
foreign aid. Economic regressions and critical analysis of aid distributions reveal such
motivation.
Foreign policy influences the flow of foreign aid as former colonies, democratic
nations, and countries offering strategic political advantages often receive greater
allotments of humanitarian aid. As displayed by the cases of China and India, prior
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loyalties tend to supersede conditions of poverty, overpopulation, and underdevelopment
that would otherwise warrant the arrival of foreign aid. Looking at bilateral aid flows,
Alberto Alesina and David Dollar found that “a country that is relatively open… receives
20 percent more aid. A country that is relatively more democratic… receives 39 percent
more aid; a country that has a relatively long colonial past… receives 87 percent more
aid.”103 This statistic reveals that allocations of aid reflect colonial ties. Haiti fits this
pattern. As a former French colony and subject of American imperialism and occupation,
respective domestic politics of these developed powers influenced aid allocations to
Haiti.104 Under President Bush, the United States disapproved of the leadership of
Aristide. As a result, “the administration continued the suspension of U.S. aid and
blocked other multilateral donors from providing aid already approved.”105 Nonetheless,
despite this temporary suspension of aid, the historical ties and valuable location of Haiti
funnel aid to the island country.
In addition, flows of foreign aid follow geo-political concerns or strategies, often
disregarding poverty or other conditions that implore for assistance. For example, the
United States continues to provide considerable support to Israel, a wealthy country
according to GDP per capita. Between 1948 and 2006, this nation received the greatest
portion of United States economic aid.106 The political and security implications of
maintaining a strong relationship with Israel directed aid towards this otherwise well-off
country. Similar motives have funneled foreign aid towards Haiti. The island’s strategic
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location offers advantages to foreign aid providers. Haiti’s close proximity to both the
United States and Cuba makes this island nation a strategic American partner in the
region.107 Further, Haiti offered markets for American goods.108 Therefore, these patterns
of flows of aid reveal political motives in aid provision. As aid can elude those in need, a
close tie between foreign aid and foreign policy becomes apparent. This tie is then highly
implicated in Haiti with the inundation of foreign aid under the Republic of NGOs.
In addition to the flows of foreign aid, the projects funded reveal political or
ideological motivations and biases. External actors hold the power to manipulate the
purpose of aid and thus, the respective project. While most foreign donors or agencies
outwardly promote development as the purpose of aid, there often remain a variety of
purposes.109 Subsequent rationales for foreign aid projects deviate from such altruistic
motives, introducing self-serving intentions. For example, within Haiti the purposes of
foreign aid that extended beyond development misaligned donor programs. Around the
turn of the twenty-first century, the World Bank, an international financial institution
influenced heavily by developed countries, attempted to institute the privatization of
many of state-owned industries.110 Privatization can increase efficiency. However,
privatization benefits domestic and foreign elites. This transfer subsequently can make
goods more expensive and less accessible to the local population. In 2007, the Haitian
government signed an agreement to privatize “nine state-owned firms in the areas of
electric power, telecommunications, transport, banking, construction, and
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agribusiness.”111 While the Haitian government signed this agreement to implement
privatization, such acquiescence to foreign aid projects met great popular resistance. In
fact, the resistance proved so overwhelming that the World Bank elected not to execute
the privatizations. Thus, with ulterior goals beyond development, foreign aid projects
digress from the purposes, preferences, and needs of local populations. This digression
once again renders visible the reality that foreign aid is foreign policy, motivated by selfserving political and ideological motives. As a result, foreign aid is incongruous with
development, only perpetuating a need for debilitating foreign assistance.
The unfortunate use of foreign aid as a vehicle of foreign policy is then implicated
in Haiti with the overwhelming inundation of NGOs and external actors. One must
remain skeptical of the effectiveness of foreign aid here, as the country “has received
billions in foreign assistance, yet persists as one of the poorest and worst governed
countries in the world.”112 A critical analysis of trends and patterns in foreign aid
allocation suggest that foreign aid is not synonymous with development. Botched
structures and motives that underlie humanitarian efforts undermine the effective
execution of aid projects. Foreign political, ideological, and cultural predispositions
affected aid. As a result, projects failed to adhere to local needs. Within Haiti, foreign aid
took the form of macroeconomic policy, security, military demobilization, health, and
infrastructure creation.113 Despite the necessity for such services, the country primarily
implored for aid that resolved political and governance issues had plagued the nation for
years. The failure to deliver such projects “nullified attempts by the donor community to
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improve conditions in Haiti.”114 The allocations of aid are thus implicated in perpetuating
a dependence upon foreign actors and the failures of a Republic of NGOs. Governments,
bilateral and multilateral agencies, and non-governmental organizations acting on behalf
of foreign policy then only seemed to make the country worse-off in the long run,
undermining Haitian capacity and sovereignty.
Thus, foreign aid projects do not exist in a vacuum. These plans “involve people
and institutions: people, with their own interests and cultural frameworks; institutions
grounded in culture and politics.”115 Therefore, humanitarian actions remain influenced
by purposes beyond development that serve to benefit donor governments or
organizations. This influence furthers the argument that foreign aid is representative of
foreign policy. To this end, David Baldwin states, “foreign aid is first and foremost a
technique of statecraft. It is, in other words, a means by which one nation tries to get
other nations to act in desired ways.”116 With foreign aid in Haiti, these botched systems
of aid, influenced by ideology and policy, became implicated in the Republic of NGOs.

The “Republic Of NGOs”: Discrepancies Between NGO Theory and Practice
Throughout Haiti, and worldwide, the spread of neoliberal policy caused an
explosion of humanitarianism, a form of foreign aid. An overwhelming and rapid arrival
of NGOs, and other humanitarian service providers led to the naming of this era as the
“golden age” for aid organizations.117 These organizations willfully adopted relief and
development projects, both in the global North and South. However, the growth and work
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of the aid sector was not purely constructive and beneficial. In addition to the influence of
foreign policy upon foreign aid, the discrepancy between NGO theory and the practice of
aid provision hindered the effective and sustainable deliverance of goods and services to
those in need. Structural characteristics of aid organizations compromised and
undermined their respective performances. The deviance from theoretical accountability
structures and the ideal coordination with the local government characterized
humanitarian efforts in Haiti. Here, the ability of humanitarianism to do harm as well as
good exacerbated pre-existing state weaknesses.
A main tenet of humanitarian aid is accountability. “Accountability is generally
interpreted as the means by which individuals and organizations report to a recognized
authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions.”118 Theoretically,
humanitarian agencies maintain downwards accountability. Downwards accountability
implies the alignment of humanitarian action with the needs and wants of beneficiaries119
This idealistic positioning of accountability allows humanitarian actors to remain
autonomous and independent. In doing so, these actors regard those receiving aid as the
most decisive constituents, ensuring that aid gets to those most in need in the necessary
form. Maintaining downwards accountability thus upholds humanitarian aid goals of
service provision, development, and “saving lives.”120
However, in reality it no longer proves possible for NGOs to remain exclusively
accountable to beneficiaries. Rather, aid organizations satisfy donors’ demands,
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influencing the intentions and processes of service provision. This reality reflects a shift
from downward accountability to upward accountability. Upwards accountability implies
the alignment of aid action with the ideals and desires of “trustees, donors, and host
governments.”121 As a result, funding often determines NGOs loyalties and priorities.
With an overwhelming portion of funding increasingly coming from private donors and
donor governments, humanitarian organizations display a greater allegiance to the
demands of these actors rather than the demands of beneficiaries. Norman Uphoff
explains that “[the] fiduciary relationship between NGO staff and trustees and those who
provide NGOs with their funds is greater than the NGO obligations to recipients of
benefits. If trust and confidence are not maintained with an NGO’s contributors, it will
collapse.”122 Given this reality, humanitarianism does not truly serve those whom it
should, as “he who pays the piper chooses the tune”.
The Creole pig incident in Haiti serves as one notorious example of the problems
with upwards accountability. Between 1981 and 1985, humanitarianism particularly
digressed from the needs of Haitian citizens, failing to ensure the wellbeing of an already
impoverished population. During this time, USAID, a major donor of international aid
funding, led an initiative to replace the native Haitian Creole pig with imported pigs from
the United States. The United States foresaw this replacement as prevention to the spread
of swine flu in pigs originating in the Dominican Republic.123 Therefore, USAID
slaughtered nearly two million pigs, replacing this livestock with American pigs that
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could not withstand the Haitian climate.124 The next wave of imported pigs to replace the
deceased were then too expensive for farmers previously owning Creole pigs to afford,
causing the USAID initiative to ultimately undermine a significant portion of Haitian
livelihood.125 Haiti’s rural farming population lost an estimated $600 million in
livestock.126 As a significant portion of donor money flowed from the United States, in
particular USAID, this country heavily influenced humanitarian performance.
Humanitarianism aligned with the wellbeing and economic prosperity of the United
States, rather than with the livelihood of local Haitians. This example highlights the gap
between theoretical and actual humanitarianism, and the respective consequences of
humanitarian aid in practice that fortify global inequalities.
The purpose of humanitarian aid deviates from serving the needs of the
beneficiaries to reflect the needs of actors with fiscal influence over an NGO. Scholar
Mohammed Haneef Atmar recognizes this misappropriation of aid as processes of
instrumentalization and politicization. This suggests that donor agencies use
humanitarianism as an instrument to further political or economic pursuits.127 The reality
of upward accountability then allows donors, foreign countries, and other actors to
influence the purpose of humanitarian action for subjective ends. Unfortunately, this
influence often results in a deviation from purely philanthropic work as “humanitarian
action is used for purposes other than humanitarianism, notably of foreign economic or
geopolitical interests.”128 Thus, a granting of preference to donors to determine the
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purpose of humanitarian efforts then holds detrimental consequences for the intended
beneficiaries, as aid is no longer tailored to the actual needs of the recipients.129
The power of donors to control humanitarian aid entering Haiti greatly
determined the projects that received funding, disregarding articulated local needs. For
example, Haitian citizens stated a priority of “revitalizing national agricultural
production.”130 However, despite this expressed priority of aid, only 4.3 percent of
USAID in 1996 addressed issues of agricultural development.131 By contrast, food aid
constituted 13 percent of the USAID budget in the same fiscal year. Under a
humanitarian aid system that prioritized downwards accountability, agricultural
development would receive a greater portion of donor funding. However, the process of
instrumentalization and politicization caused a misappropriation of humanitarianism. In
this case, food aid better served the United States economic interests, by providing a
market for American goods, than did agricultural development within Haiti. With this in
mind, USAID filtered a greater portion of funds towards food aid rather than towards
agricultural development. Thus, Haiti was not exempt from this failure of
humanitarianism as aid catered to the objectives of donors while overlooking the requests
of Haitian citizens.
In addition to altering the purpose of humanitarianism, upwards accountability
also influences which projects an NGO elects to undertake. As donors provide funding to
a humanitarian aid agency, they simultaneously establish standards and expectations for
the use of that money. In order to then monitor the adherence to such standards, donors
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implement a reward structure of evaluation. The reward structure of evaluation requires
an organization to prove that the use of funds aligns with pre-established quantified
benchmarks. Only in doing so can these organizations receive supplementary contracts
and donations. It is then most beneficial for organizations to carry out projects whose
progress can be quantified and rendered visible to donors.132 This structure, however,
limits the projects of humanitarian aid organizations. Short-term projects tend to be easily
quantifiable and visible. Meanwhile, long-term projects often entail positive externalities,
beneficial consequences of a project, and second/third order sustainable effects that are
not immediately quantifiable.133 In order to continue to receive funding, long-term
projects are then sacrificed on behalf of short-term initiatives, as “many of the things that
add most of our quality of life are not readily quantifiable.”134 Thus, the need to remain
accountable to donors heavily influences the projects and performance of humanitarian
organizations.
Throughout the golden age of NGOs, Haiti suffered from the implementation of
projects that satisfied donors’ evaluations rather than prioritizing sustainable long-term
projects. In 2005 on his visit to Port au Prince, Haiti, it became clear to Mark Schuller, an
active participant, protagonist and scholar in Haiti, that the neoliberal Haitian state no
longer accepted the responsibility of clearing piles of trash from roadways, and
unfortunately, and neither did aid organizations. As a result of the encroaching piles, it
took public transit 45 minutes to travel 4 blocks.135 To donors, picking up trash does not
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have the same attraction as building a school or health clinic.136 Moreover, an
organization cannot quantify picking up trash. Therefore, despite the articulated need for
trash pickup from beneficiaries of humanitarian aid, only one volunteer in this city
amongst a wealth of volunteerism was willing to pick up trash. Rather than developing a
sustainable waste management plan, organizations funneled funds into the construction of
quantifiable projects such as the construction of schools or clinics.137 Thus, in order to
ensure donor support for initiatives in Haiti, humanitarianism disregarded the needs of
local citizens to satisfy upwards accountability systems.
An analysis of theoretical humanitarian action extends beyond the notion of
accountability, also addressing the ideal role of the local government. The overwhelming
presence of third parties within a country can threaten the role of government.
Consequently, there is a possibility for the creation of a parallel state, carrying out the
responsibilities of the local government. To counteract this tendency, it is best for the
local government to remain in a position of coordination. In this position, governments
theoretically remain participative in and responsible for monitoring and regulating the
actions of NGOs.138 Local authorities assure that humanitarian aid complies with local
structures, laws, and needs.139 Therefore, despite the incapacity to provide the needed
services or goods for a population, the state should not completely excuse itself from the
humanitarian aid effort; but rather remain a central actor in coordination and
communication among the numerous organizations.
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Nonetheless, in practice, NGOs tend to create an alternative governance structure,
bypassing the local government. “International aid has often been criticized for ignoring,
sidelining or actively undermining local capacities.”140 This ignorance originates from a
lack of trust in the capacities and effectiveness of local governance structures and
national governments to deliver aid.141 NGOs view the state as an obstacle, slowing down
the process of aid provision and simply bypasses the government.142 As a result,
humanitarian aid organizations replace the state and create a parallel structure. This
parallel structure “undermines the social and political contract between a state and its
citizens…”143 Thus, a discrepancy lies between the theoretical inclusion of the state in
humanitarian aid provision and the reality of state exclusion from this process, creating a
parallel state by NGOs. Unfortunately, Haiti was not immune to this tendency of
humanitarianism. While humanitarian aid agencies in the end of twentieth century
provided necessary services, these aid agencies simultaneously side-stepped the already
weakened Haitian government. Good intentions then led to a botched aid effort.

Chapter Conclusion
This chapter argued that the rise of Haiti as the “Republic of NGOs” laid the
groundwork for the relief effort after the earthquake. Historical patterns of intervention
within Haiti had begun to look different towards the end of the twentieth century.
Historic foreign intervention in the forms of colonialism and imperialism now evolved
into the form of humanitarian aid. However, in the late twentieth century, onlookers
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doubted the worthiness of Haiti, justifying the arrival of external actors under the guise of
humanitarianism. Ideally, these actors championed altruistic, philanthropic work, serving
the needs of beneficiaries and including the local state for an eventual transfer of
responsibility for citizen welfare back to the rightful owner. In practice, however,
humanitarian aid digresses from this ideal. Ironically then, aid often cripples those whom
it intends to serve. This reality of foreign aid, when placed in the greater context of Haiti,
became implicated in the botched relief effort and the disaster that followed the
earthquake.
The first irony exists in the interchange between foreign aid and foreign policy.
Political and cultural ideologies realigned humanitarian relief efforts with donor motives.
These donors can then influence not only the flow of aid and whom it serves, but also the
form of aid and the implemented projects. With this influence, aid tends to deviate from
the needs of beneficiaries. Humanitarian aid then fails to serve its purpose. As a result,
the receiving populations remain hampered and suffering from the conditions that
necessitated the aid. Moreover, the plethora of non-governmental organizations under the
Republic of NGOs reflected the same skewed identity of humanitarian relief. Upwards
systems of accountability and the disregard for coordination with local efforts
encumbered the effectiveness of efforts to provide services to the Haitian population and
rebuild a weakened nation.
In general, these critiques of foreign aid and humanitarianism demand a greater
respect for beneficiary needs and of state capabilities. The humanitarian response must be
case-sensitive and context-dependent. In cases such as Haiti, ideal systems of
accountability, coordination, and independence were not even initially achievable
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following the earthquake. The pre-existing weakness of the state hindered capacity
building. Built upon years of historical domestic challenges and foreign intervention,
Haiti remained a dependent state. The country could not independently adopt or move
forward programs to improve state autonomy or authority. While this reality in itself had
a stagnant effect, the amalgamation of preexisting conditions with the unfortunate
realities of foreign aid and humanitarianism only further hampered the capability of Haiti
to respond to what would ensue.
Thus, the patchwork convergence of these conditions, forces, and actors suggests
an answer to the question ‘Why Haiti?’ Why did Haiti experience a level of unmatched
disaster? What processes and contexts predicated the seismic waves? And who may be
ultimately responsible for the extent of damage? A seemingly natural disaster occurred
within a country already tainted by global prejudices as a result of history, global policy,
and most importantly, fallacies of humanitarian aid. The Republic of NGOs, which
existed prior to January 12, 2010, set up how relief worked following the earthquake. A
lack of accountability, a lack of cultural sensitivity, as well as a lack of history and local
knowledge, further skewed aid already manipulated by foreign policy. Thus, before the
earthquake foreign humanitarian aid and a host of non-governmental organizations
established systems that undermined the effectiveness of a response to the disaster and
the rebuilding of a nation.
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CHAPTER 3
The Earthquake: “Building Back Better”
Chapter Overview
“It was like driving through a city following being totally bombed. There was
nowhere I went that buildings were not totally collapsed or partially collapsed. The
streets [were] full of people that were either displaced or were trying to recover people
out of the rubble that had either been killed or wounded…”144 This description of Haiti
the morning after the earthquake by Lieutenant General Ken Keen, who served as the
Command of Joint Task Force Haiti, depicts the unfathomable scale of physical
devastation succeeding the tremors that shook the country on the evening of January 12,
2010. Unfortunately, on this date, Haiti felt the wrath of centuries of human-made
historical processes that rendered the population defenseless and vulnerable at the hand of
tectonic plate motion. Geologic forces leveled a nation, destroying livelihoods, industries,
and infrastructure within seconds. While the casualties caused by these natural forces
must be recognized and respected, those that ensued as a result of foreign humanitarian
aid deserve far greater attention and critical analysis.
After the earthquake, the Haitian government had little capability to face the
rebuilding effort independently. The demand and rightful place of humanitarianism can
be neither ignored nor denied. At a loss, the devastated country requested the resources
and funds of the international community. In response, incredible quantities of
organizations and foreign actors arrived to supply this demand. This overwhelming
presence made imperative a system of organization and ultimately an institutionalization
of aid to better streamline relief efforts. Yet, while offering unique capabilities towards
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the rebuilding of Haiti, humanitarian aid perpetuated the historical pattern of foreign
actors holding central roles in the development of the country. As such, the dominance of
these actors neglected the agency of Haitians and the pre-existing systems within the
country. Systems of accountability deterred Haitian participation, discounting rich
networks of local support, informal markets, and cultural knowledge. This accountability
scheme unfortunately then further amplified devastation to levels that far exceeded any
geologic consequences. Thus, building on of a foundation provided in the previous
chapter that unveiled the fallacies of foreign aid, a case study of the Cluster Approach in
this chapter argues that an inundation of humanitarian relief after the earthquake
compounded the loss initiated by geologic forces. Demonstrating a legacy of the failures
of the Republic of NGOs in a new context, this chapter implicates human processes in the
disaster and calls for new approaches to aid deliverance.
This chapter opens with an account of the earthquake. While much of this thesis
illuminates the human-made processes implicated in the disaster, attention must also be
given to the details and consequences of tectonic forces. Movement along the fault line
that underlies Haiti caused incredible human and infrastructural devastation unmatched
by earthquakes of similar seismicity. These geologic forces account for only a portion of
human loss. Yet, such forces can be held accountable for the collapse of homes,
government buildings, airports, and seaports. As the media recounted and reported on the
damage, painting a picture of chaos, the international community reached out to Haiti in
ways it had never done before.
The chapter then explores the humanitarian aid response. Throughout its history
and development, Haiti was frequently subject to a foreign presence. While the form of
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such intervention evolved from the time of independence to the earthquake, after January
12, 2010 foreign actors entered the country under the veil of institutionalized
humanitarianism. The United Nations (UN), established in 1945, served as a coordinating
agency, organizing the overwhelming multitude of volunteers, resources, funds, and
organizations. As a global governing body the UN aids in the formulation and execution
of international solutions to political, economic, social, and humanitarian disputes. Under
such a broad scheme of work, this body maintains an active role in relief for both human
and natural disasters. In the midst of, and after such events, the UN coordinates and
oversees the humanitarian aid response. To efficiently disperse aid the United Nations
instituted the Cluster Approach, a system that looked to cohesively structure both
international and local efforts after a disaster. However, once implemented within Haiti,
this model of coordination excluded local voices and institutions from the rebuilding
process. This exclusion continued to devastate the country, further entrenching a
dependency upon external systems of aid.
Critically analyzing this institutionalization of foreign aid, this chapter
investigates the realities within the Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster
(CCCM) and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps. With homes destroyed across
the country, Haitians congregated in IDP camps. Camps varied throughout the country in
size, location, and services. While some existed in the rural countryside others were
located throughout the capital city, Port-au-Prince. Moreover, some camps gave refuge to
upwards of 30,000 Haitians, while others housing only a few hundred displaced persons
failed to be recognized formally. Although these camps sought to promise security and
refuge, the reality could not be farther from the ideal, with respect to shelter, sanitation,
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health care, education, and the provision of food services. The realities within these
camps revealed the fallacies of humanitarian response. The consequences of a domination
of foreign actors were two-fold. First, on the ground, a lack of coordination with the local
government and a failure to integrate the local economy left many Haitians living in substandard conditions. But more, the disregard for the infrastructure and government of the
country held implications for the perpetuation of a reliance on foreign aid that so heavily
characterized the development of Haiti.
In juxtaposition to this institutionalized response of foreign actors, this chapter
concludes with an exploration of the local markets and systems within Haiti. The Cluster
Approach failed to take into account these local systems, subsequently discounting
Haitian agency. Aid workers and scholars offer first hand observations of a surprising
activity within the country even after the destruction of livelihoods. The vibrant informal
economy within Haiti, while immediately devastated, worked to utilize and build upon
formerly established structures soon after the earthquake. These accounts serve to
illuminate the palpable sense of Haitian agency often discounted by the
institutionalization of humanitarian aid. A deliberate refusal by humanitarian aid
organizations to recognize the local participation and agency significantly impeded the
rebuilding of the Haitian state and Haitian sovereignty. Upwards accountability schemes
undermined the rebuilding of damaged local processes, replacing rather than repairing, a
far less sustainable solution. This chapter then begs for new questions to be asked
amongst foreign actors in coordinating roles with respect to the structure of humanitarian
aid.
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Thus this chapter problematizes the institutionalized humanitarian aid response.
The international community titled the effort in Haiti “Building Back Better.” Although
establishing an eloquent and optimistic title for the relief effort, this act symbolically
granted foreigners authority in the rebuilding of the country, perpetuating colonial and
imperial mentalities. As a result, foreign actors figuratively robbed Haitians of their
rightful agency to define the country’s relief effort. Foreign actors, once again, took a
prominent and leading role in governing the reconstruction of the country. This literal and
symbolic responsibility not only proved detrimental to the immediate wellbeing of the
Haitian citizenry, but also to the future sovereignty and identity of the nation. Without
local voices, upwards-accountability structures dominated rebuilding conversations and
decisions, failing to recognize and empower local processes. The work of the United
Nations then illuminated a broader point of humanitarian assistance, captured by the
subhuman conditions which many Haitians must survive. The position of foreign actors
to dominate the relief effort empowered these actors to remain in the country in a
justified position. Thus, Haiti’s unique history renders visible the greater implications of
foreign intervention, as a continued undermining of local agency hindered the future
development of a sovereign nation and perpetuated a history of foreign dependence after
the earthquake.

January 12, 2010
Human processes have figuratively disrupted Haiti since its foundation. On
January 12, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake shook the country. Haiti is located atop the
Enriquillo-Plaintain Garden fault system (EPGF), which runs east to west both in
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northern and southern Haiti.145 Particularly, along the southern border the transform fault
begins “offshore to the west of Haiti, bisects Haiti’s southern peninsula and then extends
into the Dominican Republic…”146 On this day, despite historically low seismicity,
transform plate motion disrupted the small island country.147 The epicenter of the
earthquake, with a shallow depth of only 13km below the surface, was located
geographically approximately 25 km WSW of the capital city, Port-au-Prince.148
Unfortunately, this close proximity of the earthquake to Port-au-Prince doomed much of
the Haitian population.
At the time of the earthquake, Port-au-Prince was an incredibly fragile city,
leading to significant tallies of human and physical casualties at the hand of geophysical
forces.149 This region of the country was particularly vulnerable to devastation, due to an
overwhelmingly dense population as well as an unsatisfactory construction of buildings
and homes. As is a common theme in Haiti, the inundation of foreign actors and their
respective policies created this reality. Mark Schuller, as an active participant in the relief
effort, serves as an inside actor and protagonist in the effort for Haitian solidarity.
Schuller, an assistant professor of Anthropology at Northern Illinois University, as well
as a professor at Université d’État d’Haïti, has completed noteworthy research on
globalization, NGOs, and the convergence of these concepts within Haiti. In addition to
publishing over 20 books and peer-reviewed articles, Schuller first traveled to Haiti in
2001. Most, importantly, since the earthquake, Schuller has spent extensive time within
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the country working and completing research. In an interview with the author, Mark
Schuller articulated: “the model, the neoliberal model for development in Haiti is the
cause for why Haiti was so vulnerable to disaster.”150 Neoliberal development
encouraged the overwhelming movement of rural citizens to cities.151 Lower tariffs on
agricultural products drove local farmers from their land and into urban centers in search
of revenue.152 Therefore, with respect to the population, “732,000 people lived in Port-auPrince in the 1980s, growing to 3 million by 2008. Unplanned, uncoordinated
[shantytowns] sprung up to accommodate the 2 million people who were pushed off their
land…”153 Moreover, the construction of buildings was “infamous for sloppy, makeshift,
and almost entirely unregulated conditions.”154 Population density and unsatisfactory
construction caused the immediate devastation from the earthquake to far surpass the
devastation produced by earthquakes of similar seismicity in different regions of the
world.
While exact values following the earthquake fluctuate, a significant quantity of
Haitians were proclaimed dead immediately after the earthquake on January 12, 2010.
Many sources credit tectonic forces alone for the death of 45,000 to 50,000 people.155
The collapse of poorly constructed buildings and homes trapped many people in rubble
where they could not escape. However, these numbers fail to tell the whole story. Three
years later, the government of Haiti estimated that after the earthquake a total of 316,000
150
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people had been found dead. The large discrepancy between this value and the death toll
attributed to natural forces immediately following the earthquake reveals the implications
of human processes in the devastation. The death toll, sickness, and devastation
continued to be documented months and years after the earthquake itself. This
perpetuation then implicated further actors and processes in the scale of disaster.
In addition to human casualties, the country suffered considerable structural
damage and physical casualties. The seismic tremors leveled homes, as well as
commercial, and government buildings throughout the country. The Haitian government
estimated that the earthquake destroyed approximately 250,000 homes.156 As a result,
more than two million people were forced to leave their homes, most seeking refuge in
IDP camps.157 In addition to the grounding of homes, the earthquake also destroyed
government buildings, severely impairing the capabilities of the state to respond to the
disaster. In the capital city, geophysical forces leveled 25 out of 27 government
buildings.158 Notable buildings damaged from the quake included Parliament and the
Ministry of Health. As a result, the Haitian government lacked the means to adequately
respond to the needs of its population and accept the responsibility for the relief effort.
Thus, Haiti began to look to outside help and foreign aid.
However, the arrival of aid proved difficult due to the destruction of airports and
seaports. Reflecting on the earthquake, Ken Keen explained, “Because of the geography
of Haiti being on an island, the lifeline to Haiti was its airport and seaport. The airport,
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fortunately, was not significantly damaged to the point where we couldn’t land… the
seaport was a bit larger challenge because two of its piers had collapsed…”159 In
addition, the collapse of structures throughout the country blocked roads and hindered
transportation and easy movement. This damage across the country impeded the ability of
foreign actors to respond in a timely manner. As a result, it was difficult for aid to
immediately reach those in need. By delaying the relief effort, damage to the airport,
seaport, and roadways caused by natural forces only amplified the devastation and chaos
that ensued.
As destruction and frustration mounted, media reports flowed out of Haiti
describing utter desperation. These numerous accounts spurred an incredible response
from both public and private society. On location after the earthquake, a reporter from
The Wall Street Journal detailed “cries from victims entombed beneath concrete debris
pierced the air of seemingly every street in this crowded capital Wednesday…”160
Similarly, a week after the earthquake, another reporter for Washington Post depicted a
sense of hopelessness and despair as “The streets were filled with beleaguered residents
milling about, left with no jobs, no instructions of what to do, and no place to buy food or
to take the injured.”161 Others described the scene as a “horror show” illuminating the
poverty, rubble, and bloodshed that characterized the capital city after January 12,
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2010.162 Images also flowed out of the country. These images captured the surviving
citizens pulling limbs of those less fortunate out from under rubble evoking an emotion of
desperation. Wounded children and piles of dead bodies initiated sentiments of grief and
pain from onlookers. Buildings and houses reduced to rubble created a sense of utter
chaos.

Figure 1: see url https://www.worldpressphoto.org/photo/2011danielmorelsnsl-cl

Figure 1. People help a woman who has just been rescued from rubble, January 12, 2010. Photo Credit
Daniel Morel/World Press Photo. https://www.worldpressphoto.org/photo/2011danielmorelsns1-cl
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Figure 2: see url http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/handout-photoprovided-by-the-minustah-mission-on-january-news-photo/104205526

Figure 2. Young Haitian Boy Receiving Treatment, January 12, 2010. Photo Credit Logan
Abassi/AFP/Getty Images. http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/handout-photo-provided-bythe-minustah-mission-on-january-news-photo/104205526
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Figure 3: see url http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/HaitiEarthquake/a7c229e15d9a43b4b596ba544515c18b/101/0

Figure 3. Bodies of earthquake victims lay on a street in Port-au-Prince, Wednesday, January 12, 2010.
Photo Credit Ricardo Arduengo/AP Images. http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/HaitiEarthquake/a7c229e15d9a43b4b596ba544515c18b/101/0
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Figure 4: see url https://www.worldpressphoto.org/photo/2011daneilmorelsns1-g1

Figure 4. People look for survivors after a building has collapsed, January 12, 2010. Photo Credit Daniel
Morel/World Press Photo. https://www.worldpressphoto.org/photo/2011danielmorelsns1-gl

The symbiotic amalgamation of both images and media reports depicted the
destruction in Haiti that rendered the country bewildered, overwhelmed, and in need. It
must be noted, that these images unfortunately conformed to the historical image of a
devastated state. Visual evidence of the effects of the earthquake then served to reinforce
an outsider’s perspective of the country’s tumultuous history. Chaos, rubble, and grief
both literally and figuratively permeated Haiti for nearly two centuries. Moreover, these
images provide visual evidence of the racial identities of Haitians, particularly capturing
blacks amidst the aftermath of the earthquake. This racial identity permeated not only
Haitian history and geopolitical policy addressing the country, but also maintained some
influence upon the response to the earthquake. These associations of the present reality
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with history, served to inform the public and humanitarian aid response. As a result, the
structures of aid implicated historical underpinnings and preconceived biases of the
country, biases rendered visible in media representations of the disaster.
Thus, geophysical forces caused noteworthy damage in Haiti. Tectonic plate
motion rendered visible the consequences of frequent foreign intervention and neoliberal
policy. In this way, human processes in history considerably heightened the vulnerability
of the country to disaster. On January 12, 2010, human casualties and infrastructure
damage literally and figuratively leveled Haiti. The disaster left the island nation
imploring for assistance from foreign governments and NGOs. While one must recognize
that these actors do necessary, great work, unfortunately the processes employed further
perpetuate Haitian dependence. Thus, humanitarianism, not innocent of detrimental
effects, became implicated in the aftermath of the earthquake and the development of the
country. Scholar Mark Schuller explained this negative feed-back: “In the long-term
Haitian people are subjected to foreign intervention that is imperialist and that denigrates
so that Haitians are out of the loop and less prepared for the disaster, less prepared for the
future, meaning the long term consequences of this exclusion.”163

Relief After the Earthquake: The Institutionalization of Aid
The earthquake in Haiti and the geophysical forces that caused visible and
prominent damage garnered an unmatched response from the international community.
An outpouring of private and public donations, organizations, and volunteers flooded the
country. With respect to donations, the Chronicle of Philanthropy quantified this
goodwill, recognizing that “$1.3 billion was contributed by private US citizens to NGOs
163
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within six months. At a March 31, 2010 UN conference, donors pledged US $10 billion
for the long-term response effort…”164 In addition to the money flowing into Haiti,
additional aid organizations arrived after the earthquake, supplementing those already
present, to raise the count of documented NGOs within the country to ten thousand.165
This value fails to take into consideration the plethora of undocumented organizations,
leaving the official quantity up for much debate. Nonetheless, the overwhelming amount
of aid that entered the country required some order to ensure effectiveness. Foreign
humanitarian aid became institutionalized and meant to adhere to a particular
predetermined process.
The funneling of humanitarian aid that entered Haiti primarily through private
organizations, respectively circumventing local structures, initiated the progression
towards institutionalization. Of the relief funds that arrived, the local government
received only a trivial sum. Oliver Cunningham quantified this sum as “A meager 1% of
all relief funds have gone to the Haitian government.”166 This redirection of funds came
as a consequence of external predispositions towards the country. First, histories of
foreign domination undermined assumptions of Haitian capabilities. Second, fraudulent
acts committed by political leaders in Haitian history only amplified the doubt on the part
of foreign actors. Ultimately, this allocation of funds around the government reflected
patterns of aid established under the Republic of NGOs. Mark Schuller explained these
foreign biases as, “In general… a lack of trust in the government, a historical legacy of a
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mistrust of Haiti in particular because of the role they played in ending slavery.”167
Therefore, the overwhelming majority of aid bypassed the local government, destined for
the pockets of privatized and institutionalized aid organizations. This allocation of funds
in turn distanced Haitians from positions of decision-making or responsibility, positions
central to the rebuilding of a nation. The initial allocation of funds then permitted the
perpetuation of an exclusion of local structures as foreign actors acting upon foreign
policy received financial resources to then dominate the relief effort.
Not only did private agencies receive greater funding, but these foreign actors
also received the tremendous majority of work contracts. As a result, these external
organizations, agencies, and governments took a leading role in the relief effort. Foreign
businesses in the country received significantly more contracts for work than did Haitian
businesses. Reflecting upon this unfortunate reality, Cunningham continued to recount
the proceedings of humanitarian relief after the earthquake, narrating that,
Shockingly, with the exception of limited efforts by the Clinton-Bush Haiti Fund,
virtually no aid or reconstruction funds have been allocated to Haitian businesses,
companies, or local NGOs. Of 1,490 contracts awarded by the U.S. government
after the January 2010 earthquake until November 2010, only 23 went to Haitian
companies.168
On one hand, the inequitable distribution of work contracts failed to foster the
inclusion of local businesses. A one-sided allocation did not recognize the vibrant agency
within the country. Meanwhile, on the other hand, contracts awarded to foreign
businesses further encouraged the role of these actors. This provision empowered foreign
actors to remain within Haiti in a justified position. An empowerment of the role of
foreign aid was unfortunate to Haiti as this aid promoted foreign policy rather than
167
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domestic needs. Thus, with both favorable distributions of funding and contracts, the
presence of humanitarian aid organizations skyrocketed. Such an increase in foreign
activity created the need for an organizing body, a need filled by the United Nations.
In Haiti after the earthquake, the United Nations accepted a leading role in
organizing the relief and response effort. Immediately following the earthquake,
President Préval declared a state of emergency.169 Following this declaration and without
the capacity to respond, the Haitian government required the assistance of the UN and the
United States Military. The United States Military offered assistance with planning and
executing logistics of a timely relief effort.170 Meanwhile, the United Nations initiated a
process to rebuild Haiti under the guise of institutionalized structures. In full, the United
Nations, created after World War II, maintains a founding principle to “[devise]
cooperative solutions to economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems…”171
More specifically, the United Nations offers disaster relief when the necessary response
to earthquakes, floods, disease, and famine surpasses the capacity of the local
authority.172 In Haiti, with an “empty sack” government augmented by physical
destruction, the needed response far exceeded the means of the local government. As a
result, the United Nations, a foreign institution and global governing body, took a leading
participative role in the aftermath of the earthquake. While the need for this coordination
cannot by denied, the United Nations brought institutionalized models to Haiti.
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From its conception in 1945, the United Nations continually revised the
procedures of humanitarian aid provision. The UN made initial efforts to establish an
international humanitarian coordination system with a General Assembly Resolution
48/182 in 1991.173 While this resolution succeeded in recognizing the centrality of local
activity in the relief effort in order to maintain sovereignty, it simultaneously exhibited
flaws. This document granted the United Nations responsibility in coordinating relief
efforts of the international community, but did not encourage communication and
coordination amongst the international actors themselves.174 As a result of this lack of
coordination, the use of this system established by resolution 46/182 revealed many
inadequacies. With humanitarian actors often working independently of one another,
either gaps in services or overlapping efforts characterized relief efforts. Recognition of
these inefficiencies required improvements to predictability, accountability, leadership,
and partnership among humanitarian organizations.175 These improvements looked to
ensure need-driven and well-coordinated relief. Thus pitfalls of previous humanitarian
relief coordination systems deemed the establishment of the Cluster Approach incredibly
necessary.
A recognition of gaps in the coordination of humanitarian relief efforts led to a
significant structural reform in 2005.176 In the 2005 Humanitarian Reform Agenda, the
United Nations introduced the Cluster Approach in order to “[enhance] partnerships
between UN and other international humanitarian actors, [facilitate] information sharing,
173

Neils Scott, OCHA on Message: The Cluster Approach (Geneva, Switzerland: The United Nations,
March 2012), 1.
174
United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 46/182, 78th “Strengthening of the coordination of
humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations,” December 19, 1991,
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r182.htm
175
“Cluster Coordination,” OCHA, accessed January 20, 2014, http://www.unocha.org/what-wedo/coordination-tools/cluster-coordination
176
Ibid.

87

[improve] predictability of leadership, [limit] duplications and [enhance] coherence.”177
In other words, the Cluster Approach allowed for enhanced communication and
coordination amongst humanitarian aid actors to ensure the effective delivering of aid.
The work of clusters ranged widely to include the spheres of: Agriculture, Camp
Coordination and Camp Management, Early Recovery, Education, Emergency Shelter,
Emergency Telecommunications, Health, Logistics, Protection, and Water Sanitation and
Hygiene.178 In Haiti, the United Nations first implemented the Cluster Approach
following hurricane seasons. However, after the earthquake, a need for foreign assistance,
an incapable government, and an incredible quantity of preexisting organizations in Haiti,
caused the United Nations to once again initiate the Cluster Approach on January 15,
2010. Although humanitarian aid was essential and the Cluster Approach set out to
effectively coordinate the provision of humanitarian aid, the execution of this approach
proved contradictory. The institutionalization of aid undermined Haitian sovereignty and
failed to recognize local agency.
Amidst forthcoming identification of the shortcomings of an institutionalized
response and subsequent advocacy for the recognition of Haitian agency, one must
remain critical of the capabilities of the state and at times acknowledge the need for such
a response. Despite the highlighted importance and recommended inclusion of local
agency, one must remain critical of Haitian capacity. While advocating for the
recognition of informal networks and scenarios of aid deliverance that deviate from
institutional models to incorporate preexisting systems within the country, it is important
to accept the limitations of the situation in Haiti after the earthquake. With the need to
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deliver humanitarian relief resources both rapidly and effectively following the natural
disaster, local agency was inadequate. In addition to the devastation of informal
networks, the government of Haiti lacked the human and physical capacity to accept sole
response responsibility. Although highly criticized and overwhelming at times, an
institutional aid response then proved simultaneously imperative. The geophysical
expanse and scale of need far exceeded the capabilities of Haitian networks, encouraging
a response that required the participation of institutionalized actors.

The Cluster Approach: Camp Coordination and Camp Management Exclusionary
Processes
After the earthquake in Haiti, the United Nations implemented the Cluster
Approach, a series of particular predetermined protocols for a humanitarian aid response.
Despite the goals of this approach, the protocols employed deviated from ideal structures
of humanitarian relief work: bottom-up accountability, coordination, and local capacity
building. In Haiti, after the earthquake, such an ideal structure of aid would have built
upon and coordinated with preexisting systems in the country, prioritizing local needs
and efforts over the institutionally identified needs and respective external response. Prior
to the earthquake, there existed vibrant local networks and markets to build upon in a
response. However, the Cluster Approach often deviated from this possible bottom-up
structure of aid through the exclusion of Haitian activity. As a result, institutionalized
humanitarian aid began to undermine the country’s agency and sovereignty, entangling
foreign actors in the conditions following the earthquake, foreign actors that maintained
loyalties to foreign policy. While entrenched in this argument, one must remain critical of
the plausibility of a locally grounded relief effort. The disaster damaged local networks
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and markets, hindering the capabilities of Haitians to lead a relief effort. Nonetheless,
humanitarian aid efforts can be held accountable for short-term subhuman conditions, as
well as long-term consequences with respect to Haitian development. A critical analysis
of these protocols and systems renders visible the human processes in the heightened
devastation after the earthquake.
To this end, structures of the Cluster Approach, a result of an institutionalization
of aid, caused greater exclusion of, rather than cooperation with, local actors. This
exclusion hindered the empowerment of Haitian agencies. The Camp Coordination and
Camp Management Cluster (CCCM) unfortunately served as a quintessential example of
the exclusion of the local voice. First and foremost, this cluster had only one lead agency,
the International Organization for Migration, an intergovernmental organization.
Therefore, structurally, abdicating this power to a foreign organization, the CCCM
excluded Haitians from roles of leadership and decision-making. A synthesis of personal
interviews, meeting notes and agendas, and reports on the conditions in camps further
renders visible exclusions and fallacies of this Cluster Approach in Haiti. Unfortunately,
in consequence of these fallacies, the majority of Haitian citizens suffered in subhuman
conditions and the Haitian state struggled to gain sovereignty.
To begin, the CCCM deterred Haitian participation by making it difficult to gain
access to cluster meetings and thus excluded local actors from partaking in rebuilding
efforts. Mark Schuller attended six CCCM cluster meetings and explained the steps
needed to gain access to these exclusive conversations. In an interview, Schuller bluntly
stated, “the very first exclusion took place in the checkpoint.”179 Here, those wishing to
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enter the military base needed to provide either a passport or a visa. Schuller continued,
showing the inconsistencies and biases of this requirement,
To prove a point, I went through the checkpoint not having my passport twice. To
prove that I didn’t need to… If you have a white SUV that has a NGO plate on it
and you honk the horn… the driver talks to the people, you are more likely to be
let in. But the people walking around, in mototaxis and motorcycles get stopped
by the troops. So it is very much a class thing…180
In addition to what Schuller described as a scene rooted in class, racial exclusions
also seemed to permeate cluster proceedings. Vehicles identified the clout of relief
workers, distinguishing foreign actors from local participants. A white SUV granted
Schuller access, while those using local means of transportation such as mototaxis and
motorcycles were denied entrance into the base. Schuller easily entered meetings without
question, despite failing to prove his identity with a passport. However, Schuller
explained that military guards simultaneously forbade a very high-level Haitian
government agent from entering without a passport.181 Therefore, as a result of these
conscious distinctions made by UN workers to refuse entrance to Haitians or others
assumed to be Haitian, relief excluded voices with respect to class and racial
assumptions. Foreign biases and procedures favored the participation of external actors
while excluding Haitian voices. The CCCM cluster approach then literally excluded and
discounted local knowledge and political networks. Therefore, procedures put in place
just to gain access to CCCM cluster meetings immediately limited those capable of
partaking in important conversations and decisions.
Further, the CCCM conducted meetings in English, establishing a language
barrier that favored foreign actors and excluded local participants. Schuller continued to

180
181

Ibid.
Ibid.

91

describe these coordination meetings saying “Once you get to Log Base, meetings were
held in English, which is another exclusion because…it is the common language of
foreign humanitarianism and not the language of Haitian people. So literally it is a
language of excluding people.”182 Most Haitians speak either French or Creole. These
local actors then could not listen to dialogues about the distribution of aid or enhance
these dialogues with knowledge of local needs. Meetings held in English not only made
humanitarian efforts less effective, but also reinforced the governance and leadership of
foreign actors.
The leadership of foreign actors in the institutionalized humanitarian effort, as
well as in the CCCM cluster in particular permitted a top-down accountability structure
to influence relief efforts. The location and language of humanitarianism that followed
the earthquake limited access for Haitians to important deliberations. Subsequently,
external non-governmental organizations and foreign governments narrated the relief
effort. These actors influenced allocations of aid, allocations that met the needs of donors,
national leaders, and outside decision-makers. With these actors in a leading role of the
relief effort, foreign aid was not immune to foreign policy. Therefore, those making
decisions were not those receiving the aid. Deliberations ignored Haitian infrastructure,
pre-existing systems, and local needs. This ignorance proved counter-productive. Idyllic
conversations such as the following did not occur: “Here is what we know, but you are
the one that is local. What are the needs? What do you need us to do? What are your
priorities?”183 As a result, the dominance of foreign actors in conversations about the
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rebuilding of Haiti reinforced the position of the country as a subordinate, passive,
dependent nation.
This dominance proved extremely detrimental to the effectiveness of aid.
Different constituencies maintained different perspectives of reality. Humanitarian relief
efforts shaped by foreign actors cannot fully understand the priorities, needs, and values
of the local population.184 These foreign actors can aim to understand the realities of
Haitians, “but there will always be distortions.”185 In other words, external perspectives
with a unique conditioning, different from that of the local, can never fully understand the
Haitian reality. As such, CCCM cluster meetings that excluded and thus discounted
Haitian voices and knowledge risked the effectiveness of aid provision. Moreover, the
filters of foreign perspectives hindered an acknowledgement of dissimilar cultural
processes. The conception of reality in the global North differs from the concept of
livelihood, survival, and an informal sense of employment in other regions. Without
participation of Haitians, non-Haitians underestimate these unique local characteristics
and the agency of the population.186 After the earthquake, as an institutionalized
humanitarian response fell subject to these ills, relief efforts failed to recognize and
reinforce local agency.

The Cluster Approach: What are the Consequences?
Scholars informally address the Camp Coordination and Camp Management
cluster as Camp Management, intentionally failing to acknowledge the responsibility of
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coordination.187 The lack of participation of local actors suggests a greater sense of
management by foreign actors than coordination with Haitian representatives.
Discounting local knowledge and customs at the benefit of top-down accountability
structures, held unfortunate consequences for conditions within the camps. Haitians could
not voice local needs or priorities. Decisions and processes then reflected donor
protocols, expectations, and foreign policies. Conditions within IDP camps remained
significantly below UN established adequate standards of living. Moreover, major gaps
arose in the services provided amongst the camps. This ironic reality problematized the
institutionalized humanitarian aid response after the earthquake and shed light upon the
implications of foreign dominated systems within Haiti.
First, the CCCM cluster failed to equitably ensure the provision of potable water
and sanitation to IDP camps throughout the country. Months after the earthquake, a
significant portion of camps still lacked access to potable water. To be specific, seven
months after January 12, 2010, 40 percent of camps did not have water.188 According to
the UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) guidelines on the
Guiding Principles of Internally Displaced People, “At the minimum, regardless of the
circumstances, and without discrimination, competent authorities shall provide internally
displaced persons with and ensure safe access to… potable water.”189 Therefore,
conditions within the camps failed to meet predetermined standards defined by the United
Nations. An irony then became apparent as the institutionalized humanitarian response
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inadequately provided goods and services, but an inadequacy according to self-made
guidelines. This irony rendered visible the warped accountability structure that dictated
Haitian relief and left many living in subhuman conditions. Without access to the CCCM
cluster, local actors could neither report the realities within camps or voice needs to
improve the post-disaster environment.
With respect to sanitation, an insufficient and inequitable dispersion of latrines
and cleaning services made visible fallacies of a foreign dominated relief effort similar to
those of potable water provision. The reports compiled with respect to sanitation in IDP
camps were unfathomable. According to Sphere Standards, a compilation of minimum
standards for humanitarian responses according to humanitarian actors, IDP camps
should maintain a ratio of twenty people to one toilet or latrine.190 However, realities
within the camps gravely deviated from this ratio as within Port-au-Prince an average of
273 people shared one toilet.191 In addition, 30 percent of all camps did not have toilets of
any form .192 The lack of coordination led to incredible gaps in the latrines provided
amongst the camps. For example, at the Solino IDP camp, a camp for approximately six
thousand displaced Haitians, “residents had to wait almost five months for the first toilets
to arrive.”193 The absence of latrines, belittled residents to subhuman levels, “forcing
them either to hold it and walk some 10 minutes away to an overused latrine across the
ravine or to relieve themselves in a bag and throw it in the ravine.”194 Unfortunately,
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Solino was not an anomaly. Therefore, without access to local perspectives, conditions
within the IDP camps suffered. Foreign actors focused more intently upon the promotion
of their respective goods and services rather than the real needs of the displaced Haitian
population. As a result, CCCM meetings could not problem solve without an awareness
of the problem.
Inadequate conditions extended beyond potable water and sanitation to include
the adequacy of the shelter itself within the IDP camps. The CCCM cluster held
responsibility for the provision of tarps or tents. However, the cluster did not execute a
sufficient or uniform provision of such goods. Amongst an estimation of 1.3 million
Haitians displaced immediately after the earthquake, only 10 percent of families in the
camps had a tent, the remaining population residing in IDP camps slept under tarps or
bed sheets.195 Tents provided privacy, but more importantly security from looters and
disease. While the lucky 10 percent of families received tents, many of these tents
themselves proved unable to weather Haiti’s climate. Not only did they rip easily in the
wind, but also, the material itself trapped the tropical heat.196 According to Schuller and
his fellow researchers, “in at least one camp, Noailles, the researcher estimated that
almost all the children had a rash on their bodies because of the heat that is trapped inside
tents…”197 Therefore, conditions within IDP camps continued to contribute to prolonged
devastation among Haitians. Incongruences between institutionalized humanitarian aid
and local needs hindered the effective provision of shelter to IDP camps.
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Finally, gaps within services permeated the accessibility of displaced Haitians
within camps to essential medical services. In addition to establishing expectations for
sanitation, the United Nations Guiding Principles for Internal Displacement further
includes that “competent authorities shall provide internally displaced persons with and
ensure safe access to essential medical services…”198 However, despite this principle,
“Only one camp in five [had] any sort of clinic facility on-site.”199 Camps densely
populated and with pools of standing water saturating the small pathways amongst tents
served as breeding grounds for disease and sickness. Therefore, the presence of health
clinics and medical services was imperative to prevent further sickness and death after
the earthquake. With respect to medical facilities, the failure of the humanitarian aid
response extended beyond the shear quantity of clinics. Despite the fortune of few camps
to have on-site medical centers, the quality within these camps proved extremely
unsatisfactory. Amongst his observation of IDP camps, Schuller came across a clinic
within camp Carradeux. “A tent was provided by UNICEF that [resembled] a clinic, but
it was completely empty: no medicines, no first aid supplies, and no nurse
practitioners…”200 Without basic and crucial medical resources, health within IDP camps
suffered. The lack of local actors detached foreign providers of humanitarian aid from a
sense of accountability and responsibility to the Haitian population. A foreign dominated
relief effort then held significant implications for the conditions, often described as
subhuman, within IDP camps.
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Amidst this analysis of the material distribution of goods and services, one cannot
disembody aid, but rather, must recognize that people influenced foreign aid distribution.
Aid happened through people, human actors made decisions with respect to the allocation
of aid. NGOs such as Christian Aid, Habitat for Humanity, Red Cross, and Mercy Corps,
to name a few, participated in the Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster.201
These organizations determined the allocation of temporary shelter with respect to the
communicated locations and quantities of relief delivered by fellow NGOs. Leaders
within the organization, donors, and government representatives made such allocation
decisions. NGO and foreign aid theory included within Chapter 2 demonstrated that these
decision makers maintained loyalties to foreign institutions, governments, or motives.
Humans are then implicated in the prioritization of foreign benefits and the subsequent
subordination of Haitian needs. The central role of people in the allocation of relief
services further linked human processes to the aftermath of the earthquake.
Therefore, the unsatisfactory conditions succeeding the disaster perpetuated the
devastation of the geologic event. One Haitian forced to reside in an IDP camp reflected
upon life within the camp and the treatment of displaced peoples by foreign actors,
saying “They treat us like animals’… ‘Worse! Animals live better than us’.”202 Realities
within the camps fostered continued suffering beyond January 12, 2010, augmenting
initial calculations of loss and destruction. Limited access to potable water, unhealthy
sanitation conditions, insecure and scarce shelter provisions, and inadequate medical
services all contributed to this amplification. As the months passed and Haitians
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remained in IDP camps people found dead after the earthquake elevated from initially
45,000 to an astounding 316,000.

The Cluster Approach: Lack of Recognition of the Local
Without representation of the Haitian administration within CCCM cluster
meetings, participating foreign actors discounted local knowledge, customs, and systems.
Local business and markets often remained external to the shelter rebuilding effort.
However, even after devastation of an earthquake, Haiti maintained a noteworthy and
incredible agency. Upon arriving in the country, Thomas Craemer explained what he saw
as a “beehive of activity. You saw people going about their business and removing rubble
and making their homes and engaging in informal markets. It was an extremely active
country.”203 A lack of coordination and communication with local actors discounted this
agency. The importance of local participation and the recognition of local activity did not
infiltrate into the mindset of foreign actors. As a result, a subsequent close-minded model
for relief and rebuilding impeded upon the development of Haitian sovereignty.
Institutionalized humanitarian aid operated within formal markets. However, Haiti
is a unique country in that it does not prescribe to the Western market model. Compared
to the majority of foreign actors who operate economically through formal markets,
within Haiti “90% of the total labor market comprises the informal market.”204 Despite
the destruction, even after the earthquake, this informal market remained active. On his
visit to Haiti in March, academic Thomas Craemer observed the liveliness and visibility
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of this activity. He recounted in a personal interview, leaving the airplane and taking in
the capital city:
The streets were lined with informal markets where you could buy absolutely
everything, vendors running around, people buying and selling… and that
included construction materials that were manufactured by the side of the road…
there [were]… columns, embellished concrete, where you could see the workers
on the side of the street filling wooden forms with cement and concrete and
then… putting them in these forms out to dry…and you’d see pickup trucks come
by and buy a few columns for their own construction. And you’d drive by
construction sites where you would see homeowners with columns like that and
they were putting them in.205
From this account, it becomes apparent that activity within Haiti continued after
the earthquake. Agency is particularly evidenced by instances similar to those described
by Thomas Craemer of informal labor. Geophysical devastation did not hamper
movement. Amidst streets lined with rubble, citizens continued to participate in economic
and material exchanges. The manufacturing of concrete columns revealed the inventive
and resourceful nature of the people. Instances of the exchange of goods and services
displayed continuing market activity. Both vendors and consumers remained active in the
local market. Vendors resumed business despite the devastation, providing needed goods
for the reconstruction process. Concrete columns, while only a sliver of the informal
market, were central to the rebuilding of destroyed homes. Thus, despite arguments to the
contrary, agency existed in Haiti. Media depictions of devastation and stagnation belie
ongoing efforts of Haiti to rebuild.
To move Haitians out of IDP camps, new shelters needed to be built. An
incorporation of the local economy with the required goods would not only support this
initiative, but would do so in a sustainable manner, by supporting local industry and
business. However, such investments were discouraged under a top-down accountability
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structure. As a result, Haitians had to endure subhuman conditions within the camps for a
prolonged duration. But more, the local informal economy did not receive a potentially
large humanitarian investment. While participating in relief work in Haiti with the
organization Partners in Development, Thomas Craemer recounted having permission to
purchase construction supplies solely from the formal market:
When we were buying construction materials, buckets for concrete mixing, or
something like that, we had to go to a business of the formal economy simply
because as an aid organization we needed a receipt and a receipt is important to
show that the money was spent for the right purposes.206
Therefore, systems of upward accountability undermined an investment in the
Haitian informal economy. Nonetheless, local efforts existed, displaying Haitian agency
and domestic structures that remained unincorporated into the humanitarian response.
Thus, formal markets progressed while informal markets, vital to Haitian development,
were majorly ignored.
Moreover, the institutionalized humanitarian response failed to repair local
agricultural systems destroyed by the earthquake. Many IDP camps failed to provide
sufficient food to refugees. In a documentary “Where Did the Money Go”, Michele
Mitchell asked the questions: “why did so much money buy so little relief? And why are
many still living in squalor?”207 Mitchell, the director recognized that despite the
availability of an incredible sum of aid, a half million people remained in camps, camps
that displayed subhuman living conditions.208 Thus, this film sought to unearth how and
where funds were squandered. On one of two visits to Haiti, Mitchell met Wilma Vital.
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Vital lived in camp Toussaint L’Ouverture with her daughter, still an infant. During this
encounter, Mitchell found both Wilma and her daughter malnourished, living off of
insufficient rice rations.209 This reality revealed top-down decision making structures
within cluster meetings that resolved to import American grain and rice for IDP camps
rather than empower local agricultural systems.210 American grain and rice provided
insufficient nutrition to camp residents. Haitians like Wilma were left malnourished,
reliant upon a nutrient-poor diet. Particularly for growing children, rice proved incredibly
incongruous to a healthy childhood. But more, the outsourcing of food aid perpetuated
historically similar programs implemented within Haiti. This solution filled the pockets
of external actors, while also establishing an unsustainable solution that circumvented
pre-existing Haitian agricultural systems. Schuller observed this provision, critiquing
conversations in CCCM cluster meetings. Here, proper questions were not asked to
address the distribution of nutritional goods in camps. He explained,
A concrete manifestation of the humanitarian impulse for others that you have this
unsustainable expensive system that could be captured by a lead and that could be
mismanaged… and the easier option would have been just to repair what was
already there. Similarly like how to get your food, there was definitely a need for
food assistance, how do you do that?... Could they have done it in such a way that
they could have bought from Haitian farmers and relaunched and revitalized the
peasant economy.211
In this passage, Schuller critically questioned the structures of food assistance,
imploring for the revitalization of local agriculture and economy, but his tone
simultaneously recognizing the possible limitations of these networks. Schuller seemed to
pose a rhetorical question, asking if Haitian farmers even had the capacity to
independently supply the relief effort. While it remained essential to repair what
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previously existed, what previously existed alone could not have sufficiently supplied the
demand. However, despite this identified need for external support, such support should
not have completely excluded preexisting systems, but rather worked to buttress what
Schuller identified as the peasant economy. The relief effort chose not to employ the
work of local farmers to supply the demand for food, failing to leave room for alternative
visions of aid. Haiti remained dependent upon foreign actors. Institutionalized aid
structures and subsequent solutions perpetuated the external domination of the rebuilding
of Haiti. As a result, those excluded from this rebuilding, local pre-existing systems,
remained undermined and disempowered.
Thus, the dominant voice of NGOs and foreign country leadership influenced how
aid looked after the earthquake. Under the coordination of the UN Cluster Approach, the
CCCM excluded local actors vital to the rebuilding effort. Without access or the ability to
participate in meetings, Haitians could not integrate local knowledge, systems, or markets
into the top-down institutionalized humanitarian response. Haitian agency was
noteworthy and active after the earthquake. Yet, external actors failed to acknowledge
what already existed. Dominant foreign voices introduced costly, unsustainable fixes
rather than empowering pre-existing processes. As a result, in the short-term, an
overwhelming quantity of the Haitian population left homeless were forced to reside in
IDP camps that Mark Schuller described as simply “subhuman.”212 In the long-term, an
ignorance of local efforts further perpetuated foreign dependence, undermining the
development of Haitian sovereignty. The circumvention of local efforts necessitated the
perpetuation of foreign intervention that historically dominated the county.
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Chapter Conclusion
Therefore, in this chapter, the theoretical framework comes together with on-theground examples of humanitarian relief aid to argue that humanitarian relief while
necessary, compounded loss and undermined Haitian development following the
earthquake. The subhuman realities within IDP camps and the work of the CCCM cluster
demonstrated skewed systems of aid. The devastation from the earthquake exceeded any
capabilities of the local infrastructure and government. Without local resources or
administrative capabilities immediately following the disaster, non-governmental
organizations and foreign governments filled a significant void. The resources made
available by foreign actors far surpassed the capabilities of the country alone. However, a
critique of this foreign arrival must simultaneously accompany the acknowledgement of
the good of humanitarian aid, offering a “yes, but” argument to a complex dilemma.
Therefore, one must ask, how could the humanitarian aid response have gone well?
Since independence foreign activity dominated domestic affairs in Haiti. For
nearly two centuries, external actors determined the political and economic structures
within this “independent” Caribbean country. Haiti was founded upon French conditions
in 1804, subsequent to a historical foreign presence throughout the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, and rightfully named the “Republic of NGOs”. The country offers
not only a history, but also a present reality dictated by foreign actors. The evolving
identity and form of foreign intervention and activity in Haiti did not cease after the
earthquake, but only amplified. The institutionalized humanitarian response, coordinated
by the United Nations and structured by the Cluster Approach caused foreign actors in
unmatched numbers yet again to descend upon the country. However, this inundation of
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not only foreign aid but also of subsequent foreign policy, established processes that
despite altruistic motives ironically furthered the level of devastation within Haiti.
An aid response led by non-Haitian agencies and voices excluded the
participation of those closest to the atrocity. Structural and procedural protocols hindered
the accessibility of crucial conversations in the rebuilding effort to Haitians. The
exclusion of Haitian government officials, businesses, and citizens unfortunately held
grave implications for those finding refuge in IDP camps after the earthquake leveled
homes across the country. Within the CCCM cluster, an inequity in power, as well as an
inability to communicate needs between actors dispersing goods and those passively
receiving such aid hindered the effective distribution of humanitarian relief.
As a result of this exclusion in the CCCM cluster, the conditions of IDP camps suffered.
Haitians left homeless after the earthquake, lived in unsanitary, insecure, and
significantly under-sourced environments. Displaced peoples were forced to endure
unbelievable realities, realities that demonstrated the fallacies of the Republic of NGOs
and foreign aid. The absence of local knowledge from cluster meetings rendered these
subhuman conditions unrepresented and unsolved. The Cluster Approach then
exemplified and reinforced a theoretical understanding of aid. Dominant foreign actors
and non-governmental organizations influenced by subjective motives implicated
themselves in the scale of the disaster and the unfortunate livelihood of hundreds of
thousands of Haitians after the earthquake.
However, the implications of a foreign-led disaster response were not isolated
within the camps. Haiti faced larger issues as the country looked to rebuild its
infrastructure, reestablish its government, and repair its image as a sovereign,
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independent nation. Thus, while NGOs and foreign countries began to rebuild the nation
physically, these actors also began to rebuild the nation figuratively, a process
detrimental to the future of Haiti. The relief effort, titled by the international community
as “building back better” symbolized the guidance and determining power of external
actors. These actors literally gave a title to the relief effort, robbing Haitians of the
agency to redefine and rebuild their country. Therefore, the presence of foreign actors
following the earthquake continued to govern Haitian development. Without sovereignty,
the presence of external actors not only proved detrimental to the conditions within Haiti,
but also to the future of the country in years to come. A problematization of the
humanitarian response thus challenged the work of foreign actors to recognize the evident
and visible Haitian agency, agency that deserved respect, recognition, and participation in
the rebuilding of the country.
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CHAPTER 4
Cholera: An Ironic Opportunity for Haiti
Chapter Overview
In the final days of October 2010, Haitians took to the streets. Protests broke out
in the town of Mirebalais and soon progressed into the north of the country. Jonathan
Katz, an AP reporter on assignment in Haiti described a scene in which “Furious men
pummeled aid stations with rocks and Molotov cocktails, burning tires and slashing clinic
tents… Now the anger seemed ready to boil.”213 Dr. Louise Ivers served as a Senior
Health and Policy Advisor for Partners in Health, a Clinical Director and most recently,
as the Chief of Mission for Partners is Health in Haiti from 2003 until 2012. In an
interview, Dr. Ivers recounted “people writing in Haitian Creole, ‘down with the
UN’…”214 These outbursts of anger, directed towards the UN presence within Haiti
escalated on October 29, when “hundreds of protesters marched from Mirebalais to the
Nepalese base carrying tree branches, banners, and Haitian flags” chanting “Like it or
not, the UN must go.”215 Poignant protests implored for the departure of foreign actors
from Haiti. The United Nations, which had long maintained a peacekeeping presence
within the country and embodied the frontline of humanitarian aid, had come to represent
the polar opposite. Blue helmets adopted a new, deleterious significance.
Months after the 7.0 magnitude earthquake shook Haiti to its core, in early
October, Haiti experienced yet another defining moment in its tumultuous, foreigndominated history. In bitter irony, UN MINUSTAH troops responsible for the mission of
holding peace within the nation, instead initiated unmatched domestic turmoil. Nepalese
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troops arriving in Haiti on October 9, 12, and 16 unknowingly carried along with their
luggage, the Vibrio cholera bacterium, a strain of the cholera bacteria originally found in
eastern Asia.216 Conditions after the earthquake left the country particularly vulnerable to
the unimpeded spread of disease from rural to urban settings. The reality of disrupted
water and sanitation systems, overcrowded camps, and often-nonexistent health care
provision not only problematized, but also revealed the limits of a foreign-dominated
humanitarian response. Sickness proliferated across the country, resulting in upwards of
658,563 confirmed cases of cholera as of June 2013.217 Foreign aid to Haiti directly
undermined the wellbeing of the country and its people. Therefore, this chapter argues
that humanitarian relief ironically created a new crisis in Haiti. However, amidst
widespread death and loss, this chapter argues that a particular response to the disease
pointed the way towards an accountable system of relief that encouraged local
participation and thus recognized Haitian agency, an important step in the building of
national sovereignty and capacity.
As days passed from the time of the initial outbreak and more intelligence became
available, an understanding of the preliminary cause of the epidemic came to directly
implicate foreign actors in the arrival of the bacteria. Therefore, in October of 2010, the
intervention of outsiders that for years permeated Haitian history, wrote yet another
unfortunate chapter in the complex story of the nation. This chapter begins by delving
into the cholera epidemic within Haiti. A synthesis of media accounts revealed the
information and reactions in the early days of the epidemic, as the country dealt with
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widespread confusion and fear. With this context, the chapter then briefly regresses to
unearth the disease’s symptoms as well as the conditions conducive to its spread.
Next this chapter builds off of a long-term theme in Haitian history of foreign
intervention, investigating not only the initial introduction of the disease, but also the
conditions that existed within Haiti prior to the outbreak of cholera that fostered the
disease’s rapid diffusion. First and foremost, the arrival of cholera directly implicated
outsiders in another simultaneous disaster within Haiti. Secondly, both historical
processes and the humanitarian response to the earthquake made the country particularly
vulnerable to the subsequent spread of disease. Prior to the earthquake, Haiti suffered
from a lack of access to potable water and sanitation infrastructure. A compilation of
reports by the United Nations, the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP), and
a presentation by a Haitian government agency, the National Directorate for Potable
Water and Sanitation (DINEPA) provided statistics about pre-existing access to basic
services. Moreover, after the earthquake, conditions throughout the devastated country
and within IDP camps only amplified Haitian vulnerability. Therefore, conditions within
Haiti prior to the arrival of cholera, elucidated the insufficient infrastructure within the
country due to the state’s inability to provide public services, and thus the debilitating
reliance on inadequate institutionalized humanitarian aid.
This chapter then concludes with an in-depth analysis of the Water, Sanitation,
And Hygiene (WASH) Cluster, a humanitarian response to the cholera outbreak that
offered a hopeful, new model for aid. The WASH cluster received praise for its unique
structure that encouraged the participation of local Haitian citizens and infrastructure.
The empowerment and participation of the DINEPA combined with an improved
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accessibility to meetings facilitated sustainable improvements to conditions within Haiti.
As a result, the work within the WASH cluster not only curtailed the scale of loss due to
cholera, but also, more importantly, built the capacity of local government
administrations to hopefully accept exclusive future responsibility. I suggest that the
adherence to ideal humanitarian relief structures not only ensured an appropriate response
to disaster, but also presented an instance of hope for the sovereignty of the country
amidst a climate of fear and loss. Therefore, the work within this cluster to respond to
the cholera epidemic empowered preexisting Haitian institutions and infrastructure,
ultimately offering a new model of humanitarianism that pointed towards a future that
recognized and incorporated the country’s agency.
Thus, while the cholera outbreak in Haiti brought incredible devastation to a
population already recovering from loss, this epidemic simultaneously illuminated points
of optimism in the revision of historical patterns of foreign intervention and the
establishment of Haitian sovereignty. To respond to the water, sanitation, and health
needs of Haitians, the country looked outwards, to foreign actors, seeming to suggest a
continued pattern of historical foreign intervention and domination of domestic
processes. However, the structures subsequently employed in the provision of these
services suggested otherwise. The implementation of theoretical humanitarian aid
strategies seemed to usher in a promising paradigm for the rebuilding of nation. Finally, it
seemed, aid began to empower local institutions, consequently substituting Haitian
agency and infrastructure for the work of foreign actors. Robert Chambers identified this
process as “putting the first last and the last first.”218 By “putting the first last and the last
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first,” multilateral agencies, international NGOs, and senior decision makers residing in
foreign countries make way for the participation and empowerment of NGOs and
government agencies of globally southern, underdeveloped, and impoverished countries
like Haiti.219

Cholera in Haiti: Fear and Confusion
In October of 2010, a strain of cholera, Vibrio cholera, arrived in Haiti, initiating
an unmatched scale of loss and fear. Three years after its arrival, cholera can be credited
with the death of 8,111 Haitians and the reported infection of 658,563 citizens.220 With
these numbers, Haiti quickly became the country with the leading number of cholera
cases, a title not to be championed.221 Prior to 2010, cholera had infiltrated the Western
hemisphere and countries of Latin America. However, the island of Hispaniola luckily
remained isolated from these epidemics. As a result, “Haiti had never seen the bacteria
before, [and] the population had no immunity against it. It bred prolifically, among the
population and in each person it infected.”222 Without immunity or protection, cholera
then swept across the country. Moreover, without prior exposure to cholera, a disease to
which incredible quantities of citizens fell ill, Haiti became enveloped in a climate of
fear. Anxiety and confusion characterized the country. Dr. Louise Ivers who was present
in the country at the time of the outbreak, described the outbreak in that,
It was really dramatic, and therefore very frightening, especially if you don’t have
any cultural experience of it. So you can imagine, just suddenly every single adult
219
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person getting sick. People dying and not having any idea what or where it was
coming from or how it spread or who had participated in it. So there was fear
initially, which is somewhat expected in such a circumstance.223
The immediacy and expanse of such grave death rattled local logic. With the
arrival of the disease and the fear described by Dr. Ivers, Haiti experienced yet another
traumatic event that perpetuated the country’s unfortunate history of human-made
disasters. Amidst the recovery from a debilitating earthquake, Haiti experienced yet
another disaster. While the earthquake and the cholera outbreak remained distinct
incidents that cannot be directly linked, the reoccurrence of similar themes in a shared
setting furthers critiques on humanitarian aid. The cholera outbreak served as the bitterest
example of a relief effort.
Media reports coming out of Haiti after the outbreak of the epidemic further
recounted the frantic scenes across the country, as victims received needed care in health
centers and attempted to make sense of an unknown illness. In the first days of cholera at
St. Nicholas Hospital, located in the Artibonite region where the outbreak first began,
“500 people flooded in Thursday night with symptoms of cholera and a further 437 came
in Friday morning…”224 With this overwhelming inundation of patients, hospitals
became chaotic silos of care. One reporter at St. Nicholas Hospital described that
“Hundreds of patients lay on blankets outside…with IVs in their arms for rehydration.”225
Unfortunately, such a scene was not unique to this hospital. Another article coming out of
Haiti reported commotion as “Medical staff rushed about to diagnose and treat more than
223

Ivers, interview.
Becky McKay and Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, “Cholera Found in Haiti’s Capital” Wall Street Journal,
October 23, 2010, accessed January 15, 2014,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303738504575567882252623198
225
Anonymous, “Haiti Disease Outbreak Kills Dozens,” Wall Street Journal, October 21, 2010, accessed
January 15, 2014,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304023804575566631692962708
224

112

80 people with oral rehydration salts and intravenous fluids…”226 Thus, in the days
immediately following the outbreak, already derailed from the aftershocks of an
earthquake, Haiti began to deal with yet another challenge amidst the rebuilding of the
country.
Cholera, a dangerous bacterial infection can cause rapid death amongst patients of
all ages. Initially after infection, symptoms do not seem extremely abnormal,
characterized by upset stomach, diarrhea, or a fever.227 However, if left untreated, the
symptoms of cholera can quickly worsen. Rapid dehydration can make victims unable to
stand or eat, symptoms quickly followed by death.228 The World Health Organization
(WHO) articulates the dangerously swift nature of the disease in an institutional
definition of cholera, stating: “Cholera is an acute diarrhoeal disease that can kill within
hours if left untreated.”229 Once the bacterium is present within a region, inadequate
water and sanitation conditions make populations and areas particularly vulnerable to the
spread of the disease. Dr. Ivers explained “Cholera is a disease that is spread from largely
contamination of water supplies, more rarely from direct person-to-person
transmission.230 As a result, countries with damaged or insufficient water and sanitation
systems, such as Haiti are increasingly susceptible to waterborne illnesses like cholera.
Within Haiti, the conglomeration of many unfortunate factors caused a
previously unmatched scale of atrocity. The death toll and instances of sickness grew
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rapidly and to incredible heights in the days following the outbreak. The arrival of
cholera made the country, yet again, susceptible to a human-made disaster. The epidemic
represented a specifically paradigmatic example of foreign intervention gone awry.
Therefore, cholera in Haiti only further reflected the unfortunate theme and consequences
of intervention that began after independence and continued beyond the earthquake, a
theme that appeared for so long to ignore local agency and hinder the development of
country’s sovereignty. With a particular focus upon the presence of foreign actors within
Haiti and the implications of this presence on the unraveling of the disaster, it becomes
pertinent to explore how the bacteria arrived in the country and the conditions that
fostered the spread of the disease

Cholera in Haiti: A Perpetuation of the Fallacies of Foreign Aid
Foreign actors within Haiti proved detrimental to the wellbeing of the nation and
the local citizens. Outsiders arriving in new locations often suffer from a potentially
harmful, yet unavoidable, naivety. In particular, within Haiti, foreigners lacked
knowledge of the local infrastructure, language, and lifestyles, such as the reliance upon
the public water supply that characterized daily activities for most residents. This lack of
knowledge was indicative of a longer-term pattern of behavior throughout the country’s
history. Therefore, regrettably, months after the earthquake, this presence continued to
undermine the health of Haitian citizens and the development of the nation’s agency.
In October of 2010, international UN peacekeeping troops became directly implicated in
the health of the country. These UN peacekeeping troops, also known as the
MINUSTAH, the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, arrived in 2004, after a
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coup that overthrew Jean-Bertrand Aristide. With an unstable political climate, the
peacekeeping mission placed “Chileans in the Haitian north, Sri Lankans covering the
southeast, Brazilians running much of the capital, and so on.”231 Since this period of
Haitian history, the MINUSTAH has remained in the country amidst times of peace and
turbulence. This continued presence, without regard for necessity, garnered some critical
reactions. Dr. Ivers provided a narration of this occupation, questioning motives. She
noted that “[the] UN did surge soldiers that were there because of the earthquake in an
effort to try and repair some of the physical infrastructure things…[Yet] they are there to
provide security, and they are there to provide security in a country that doesn’t have any
conflict.”232 In other words, the troops served as a visible representation of foreign
intervention, with little regard for the domestic political climate. This presence then
epitomized the consequences of humanitarian aid, a form of historical foreign
intervention within Haiti.
Although on an institutionally launched mission, these troops continually
undermined Haitian sovereignty. Katz reflected this understanding of the MINUSTAH
throughout Haitian development, writing, “…the UN peacekeeping mission was the
vanguard of international aid and relief in Haiti- the most visible emblem of the
international presence in the country.”233 Therefore, the presence alone of MINUSTAH
troops served to visibly, undermine the movement towards a self-agent and sovereign
nation of Haiti. Amidst times of peace the blue helmets remained omnipresent. Beyond a
literal presence, the maintained occupation figuratively suggested mistrust in the
capability of local governance and in the pacific population. In such a way, the United
231
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Nations furthered a pattern within the nation’s history of foreign intervention, an
intervention often lacking respect for the Haitian context or conditions. Unfortunately,
the perpetuation of this pattern incurred new consequences upon the vulnerable nation in
early October of 2010 with the arrival of cholera.
During this time, a new contingent of MINUSTAH troops arrived in Haiti. This
unit, as a group of outside actors, prompted an unfamiliar consequence of the foreign
presence upon the health of the island nation’s population. These actors initiated yet
another human-made disaster through the introduction of a disease to which none of local
residents had immunity. This introduction literally endangered the entire population to
sickness and death. Specifically, this unit of peacekeeping troops arrived in Haiti on
October 9, 12, and 16 respectively. Given these dates, the members of the unit were in
Nepal during a cholera outbreak and thus exposed to the bacteria.234 Once at the
MINUSTAH base within Haiti, broken sewage drainage from the camp where Nepalese
troops resided funneled contaminated waste into the nearby river. According to Benny
Avni, a reporter for Newsweek Global, the cholera epidemic began in the following way:
Several independent epidemiological reports concluded that the Nepali
peacekeepers infected with a strain of cholera prevalent in south Asia and found
specifically in Nepal’s Katmandu, but never seen in the Western Hemisphere,
contaminated a river near their MINUSTAH camp.235
Thus the lack of knowledge of these foreign actors held grave consequences for
the local Haitian population. The insufficient sanitation conditions at the Nepalese camp
permitted the entrance of human waste into the Meye Tributary or the Artibonite River.236
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Moreover, this proved to be an incredibly unfortunate location for the bacteria as the
Artibonite River, “the most important river in the nation had become an artery of
disease.”237 Haitians relied on the river for bathing, washing, cleaning, drinking, and
cooking and often did not treat the water prior to use.238 As foreigners, MINUSTAH
troops lacked reverence for the significance of this water supply, an unintentional yet
detrimental ignorance of outsiders. As a result, cholera spread easily and rapidly amongst
the Haitian population. A peacekeeping mission paradoxically killed thousands and
infected hundreds of thousands of citizens. The presence of outsiders weakened the
country to the ramifications of a cholera epidemic. Cholera then, represented a specific,
yet tremendous tragedy that reinforced the previous instances of botched intervention. A
critical analysis of not only the literal arrival of the disease, but also the conditions of
preexisting infrastructure that aided in the spread of cholera further problematizes the
structures of foreign activity and humanitarian aid in a figuratively empty nation.
Poor sanitation and potable water provision, while particularly prevalent after the
earthquake, dates back to the early 1900s, when poor water quality initiated the spread of
disease and health concerns within the country.239 Foreign assistance began to participate
in the improvement of sanitation and water conditions within Haiti under Jean-Claude
Duvalier. Duvalier recognized these poor conditions during his rule and coupled with the
simultaneous opening of the country to foreign actors, sought outside assistance to
improve sanitation and water systems projects in the 1980s.240 However, political turmoil
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and violence that plagued the final years of the regime delayed foreign efforts, hampering
the timely completion of improvement plans.241 International donors and agencies
hesitated to invest in a country amidst an unstable and unpredictable political climate.
Therefore, given the lack of capacity of the Haitian government and infrastructure,
leaders were forced to reach beyond national boundaries to improve conditions within the
country. Yet, the failure to completely improve infrastructure revealed early signs of
detrimental foreign intervention. External actors adopted domestic responsibilities,
making the country vulnerable to the consequences of current humanitarian aid structures
that often prioritized donor accountabilities and ran parallel to Haitian infrastructure or
agencies. As a result of this Republic of NGOs that began in the late twentieth century,
Dr. Louise Ivers explained decades later, that Haiti still “[had] so many baseline
needs.”242 Specifically, the combination of deficient local systems with unreliable foreign
aid, impeded the access of Haitian citizens to potable water and sanitation. Moreover, the
earthquake in 2010 and the further arrival of external actors only further threatened
access to potable water and sanitation services.
The unsatisfactory conditions within Haiti prior to the introduction of the bacteria
into the Artibonite River amplified the scale of the epidemic. Poor water and sanitation
infrastructure particularly aided in the spread of the bacteria throughout the country. First,
sanitation infrastructure within Haiti was almost nonexistent, an absence that gave way to
the rapid dispersion of cholera outward from the Artibonite region.243 Several reports
reveal this absence. At the time of the outbreak of the epidemic, the Ministry of Public
Health and Population reported that 83% of the Haitian population had no access to
241
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adequate facilities for human waste.244 The Haitian population in both rural and urban
areas displayed an inaccessibility to adequate facilities. To this end, “[access] to
improved sanitation is low even in urban areas at 24%...”245 Meanwhile, in rural regions
of the country an astounding 43% of residents did not have access to any form of
sanitation service.246 Therefore, the poor sanitation conditions throughout the country that
predated the cholera outbreak created the unluckily ideal environment for the wide spread
of the disease.
In addition to lacking a sanitation infrastructure, prior to the arrival of cholera,
Haiti suffered from poor accessibility to potable water. According to Dr. Ivers, “Very few
people [had] access to potable water. Haiti [scored] very low on a list of access to potable
water.”247 According to a United Nations report, “it was estimated in Haiti that 50% of
urban residents and 30% of rural residents had no access to potable water…”248 With this
lack of potable water infrastructure, Haitians relied heavily on the country’s river system.
As previously mentioned, the river contaminated by the cholera bacteria proved central to
operations within Haiti, providing residents with a resource for drinking, washing,
cleaning, and waste disposal.249 To quantify this reliance, prior to October 2010, 1.5
million people depended on the Artibonite River for these activities. Further, a Center for
Disease Control (CDC) survey showed that nearly two-thirds of this population did not
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treat the river water before drinking.250 Extrapolating from graphic data provided in the
National Plan for the Elimination of Cholera in Haiti, the Artibonite and the central
departments of Haiti displayed the greatest deficiency in the level of access to running
water. As a result, the departments consequently had two of the highest incidence rates of
cholera between 2010 and 2013, with 8 percent and 10 percent respectively.251 Data then
showed a direct correlation between potable water accessibility and an incidence of
cholera.
Finally, fears of the spread of disease rose tremendously given the subhuman
conditions that characterized IDP camps succeeding the earthquake. Standing water,
densely populated living quarters, and an absence of sanitation and potable water made
these environments particularly vulnerable and subsequently exposed to the spread of
disease. As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, conditions within the camps did not meet
the minimum requirements established by the Sphere Standards. The United Nations
reported that only 11 formally registered camps had waste management systems,
providing for only 4 percent of the total population within the camps.252 In early
November, a New York Times article reported that “A cholera outbreak that had been
largely confined to the countryside [had] begun to spread in the teeming capital filled
with overcrowded, unsanitary earthquake survivor camps, prompting authorities on
Tuesday to brace for a more sever epidemic…”253 Death and sickness in the camps that
lacked latrines and running water abound with standing water, became an unfortunate
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common reality throughout the devastated country. The conditions within the camps then
again implicated the botched systems of aid predicated by the work of foreign actors. A
lack of local knowledge and the maintenance of upward accountability served detrimental
to water and sanitation conditions for many displaced Haitians, making this population
particularly susceptible to the spread of disease. Thus foreign intervention once again
played a hand in a Haitian disaster, as the widespread proliferation of cholera can be
attributed to human-made processes.
The absence of government capacity and preexisting systems made the Haitian
population particularly vulnerable to the spread of disease. Emerging from decades of
political turmoil and weak leadership, public infrastructure and institutions to provide
goods and services to citizens were either non-existent or severely insufficient. Thus, it
would be inaccurate to dismiss the role of the Haitian government wholly in predicating
conditions for the spread of cholera. However, the government may not be the only actor
culpable for this vulnerability. The Haitian history of political turmoil and weak
leadership maintained a cyclical cause-effect relationship with external actors. Either in
recognition of the needs of Haitians or in response to requests for assistance, foreign
governments and humanitarian aid organizations entered Haiti. Warped systems of
accountability favoring donors and bypassing the needs of local citizens hindered the
construction of required infrastructure improvements. This foreign intervention and the
adoption of Haitian administrative responsibility impeded upon the reconstruction of the
country’s agency. Therefore, in addition to the serving as the carrier of the bacteria into
the country, foreign actors played a leading role in augmenting the preexisting
vulnerability of the Haitian public, and ultimately in the largest cholera epidemic to be
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recorded both temporally and spatially worldwide. However, born out of utter tragedy
and loss, the WASH cluster seemed to exemplify a model for humanitarian relief efforts.

The WASH Cluster: The Recognition of Haitian Agency
Despite the disastrous impact of the cholera epidemic in Haiti, the WASH cluster
not only efficiently worked to lessen the impact of the disease, but also pointed the way
towards effective models of humanitarian aid that may indicate greater agency for the
country in the years to come. With an epidemic developing, this cluster set out to repair
and improve the preexisting, largely ineffective, water and sanitation infrastructure. The
incorporation of a Haitian government agency, as well as the incorporation of local
participation and knowledge made efforts extremely timely and successful. This cluster,
then offered a new model for relief work, fulfilling ideal downwards accountability
schemes and coordination with resident authority. While this cluster seemed to rectify
dominant upward accountability and an ignorance of Haitian agency, greater
improvements can still be made and challenges to this solution remain. Nonetheless,
much must be said for the instructive example of the WASH cluster in response to an
unmatched disaster in Haiti.
Prior to the arrival of the WASH cluster and subsequent aid organizations, the
country suffered from poor sanitation and water provision. However, in the early years of
the twenty-first century, the nation underwent a series of reforms, displaying an internal
effort to enhance conditions within the country, and more importantly exemplifying local
agency. Such local agency was visible in 2009 when the Haitian parliament voted into
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law the reform of the water and sanitation sector of the country.254 This reform not only
came from the identification of continually unsatisfactory conditions, but also from the
fragmented, unregulated, and poor coordination amongst aid providers.255 Thus to curtail
these inadequacies the reform of 2009 “created a regulatory body, the National
Directorate for Potable Water and Sanitation (DINEPA), and laid out its organizational
structure, as well as its funding evaluation and control mechanisms.”256 In other words,
Haiti established an institution, the DINEPA, a government agency, to better coordinate
domestic efforts with those of foreign actors. This institution then provided some
oversight and direction for aid entering the country to improve sanitation and water
provision.257 Thus, the reform put a domestic government organization in the role of
regulation, monitoring, and development, revealing local agency and infrastructure of
Haitians to confront poor water and sanitation conditions. This reform then demonstrated
the initial steps taken by the hampered island country towards establishing domestic
capacity prior to the earthquake.
Nonetheless, the earthquake in January 2010 threatened to disrupt the reform and
the small effort towards Haitian sovereignty. As the effects of the earthquake further
damaged already inadequate infrastructure, foreign actors yet again infiltrated the country
to improve local conditions. Therefore, to better coordinate these efforts in the days
following January 12, 2010, as previously mentioned, the United Nations instituted the
Cluster Approach. While many clusters ineffectively orchestrated and coordinated relief
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efforts, the WASH cluster stood as an exemplary model. Improving conditions both in
rural and urban areas, this cluster heavily worked to integrate local infrastructure,
fostering Haitian participation. Unique characteristics of this cluster that made such
participation possible included the nominations for lead cluster agencies, the locations of
the cluster meetings, and the language of the cluster meetings. As a result, the WASH
cluster reinforced Haitian agency and encouraged the growing capacity of local efforts.
The dominating presence of foreign actors in the rebuilding of the nation seemed to be
dissipating, making way for the development of national infrastructure and agency.
First, the WASH cluster made an innovative yet necessary movement,
establishing the DINEPA as a co-lead agency, pairing with UNICEF, a United Nations
organization. Previously the WASH Cluster had “not always been coordinated with
Haitian government entities, such as DINEPA and MSPP, or local municipalities.”258 The
MSPP is the French acronym for the Ministry of Public Health and Population. As the
title of the agency suggests, the responsibilities of this ministry include but are not
limited to implementing public health and population policies, regulating both public and
private institutions working in these fields, and participating in the writing of related
legislation.259 However, deviating from previous models and criticisms of the WASH
cluster, this new approach served to include preexisting infrastructure in the cluster
system, an inclusion that became increasingly significant with the cholera outbreak in
October of 2010.
After the outbreak, WASH cluster organizations rushed yet again to Haiti. More
than 100 organizations arrived to aid in the effort to protect the Haitian population from
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cholera, organizations that included CARE, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, and
PAHO to name a few. This overwhelming inundation then required organization and
effective management in order to ensure an applicable and constructive response.
Notably, this response empowered and incorporated the DINEPA. As a co-lead, the
DINEPA received registration, legal documents, and descriptions for all projects pursued
under the WASH cluster.260 This submission process directly included Haitian agencies
in the rebuilding process As a result projects were accountable to local institutions,
allowing the DINEPA, a Haitian agency, to gain knowledge of domestic proceedings and
a respective authority. Therefore, Haitian agencies adopted a central participatory role in
the redevelopment of local infrastructure. The WASH cluster looked different as terms
not often used to characterize relief efforts in Haiti, such as synergy and intersectional
action, could then accurately describe the response of this cluster. These terms recounted
the more beneficial total effect of collaborative work between Haitian agencies that
offered local knowledge and international humanitarian aid organizations that provided
resources and funds. Thus, this cluster illuminated a hopeful movement in the trajectory
of foreign intervention in relief efforts.
In addition to the integration of a Haitian administration as a co-lead, WASH
cluster meetings encouraged local participation. First, the locations of the meetings made
these important dialogues accessible to Haitians. Uniquely, WASH cluster meetings were
held outside of the UN Logistics Base, taking place instead in city halls.261 This location
then, symbolically combatted exclusivity that characterized the meetings of other
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clusters. In city halls and on a departmental level, the Haitian population theoretically,
had an easier time becoming involved in decisions and conversations. Dr. Louise Ivers,
who attended many cluster meetings after the cholera outbreak explained that these
meetings, had a “different tone.”262 With a government member as a cluster lead, in
charge of the meetings held in accessible locations, the WASH cluster fostered local
coordination and utilized this opportunity to recognize local voices or needs. At one
WASH cluster meeting, the Haitian president himself was present in order to assure the
clearance of certain NGO goods through customs to make them accessible to the
population.263 Other Haitians present at the meetings also included representatives and
coordinators of regional outposts of the WASH cluster.264 Thus, although there currently
remains a lack of evidence of participation of individual Haitians, these meetings became
open forums for more location-specific conversations and bottom-up systems of
accountability.
Moreover, WASH cluster meetings were often not held in English, a language
that characterized not only the meetings of other UN clusters, but also humanitarian aid
itself. Instead, the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene cluster conducted meetings largely in a
mixture of French and Creole, using English sparingly.265 French grounds language more
in the Haitian context than does English. Yet, not all Haitians speak French, while all
Haitians are fluent in Creole.266 Nonetheless, these improvements continued to encourage
clear, two-way communication between aid workers and the local population, a
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communication that proved integral to effective aid deliverance. Mark Schuller reflected
upon this communication, stating in an interview: “The communication of needs and
resources, and the priorities of resources, is the most important of communication.”267
Basic procedures implemented by the WASH cluster immediately curtailed exclusivity,
improving the accessibility of decision-making processes, and thus fostering coordination
with local infrastructure and civil society. Therefore, these procedures recognized
preexisting Haitian institutions and acknowledged local agency.

The WASH Cluster: Bearing Fruits of Coordination
Given these structures that encouraged cooperation with Haitian agencies,
response programs to cholera within the WASH cluster positively reflected the
integration of local infrastructure. This integration was constructively implicated in the
subsequent fostering of Haitian participation and the respective building of agency as the
country continued to rebuild after the earthquake. By combining Haitian knowledge with
foreign resources, projects served those in need, rather than those in positions of
power.268 With the clear articulation of these needs, actors within the WASH cluster
efficiently communicated and organized the provision of goods and services. As such the
DINEPA accepted leading responsibilities on projects to deliver potable water, as well as
improve sanitation conditions. In this way, previously unrecognized Haitian
infrastructure not incorporated into relief efforts became an integral actor, directly
coordinating with the United Nations and the wealth of NGOs responding to the outbreak
of cholera.
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First, collaboration occurred between the United Nations, UNICEF, and the
DINEPA, the Direction Nationale de l’Eau Potable, a Haitian government agency, to not
only respond to the needs illuminated by the epidemic, but also to build Haitian capacity.
Notes from a WASH cluster meeting reported that UNICEF delivered desludging trucks
to the DINEPA.269 With this delivery, UNICEF equipped the DINEPA with the necessary
resources to have the capability to improve sanitation conditions, curtailing the spread of
cholera. Therefore, the transfer of trucks from an institutional actor to a local agency
subsequently transferred responsibility to the Haitian government. Moreover, this cluster
report detailed efforts of both UNICEF and the DINEPA to establish at a minimum, 50
Water Kiosks throughout Port-au-Prince to distribute free, clean water to local residents.
Beyond the Water Kiosks, DINEPA further established a partnership with city
governments to distribute aquatabs and soap at schools and camps.270 As a result of these
programs in partnership with the UN and respectively affiliated agencies, the DINEPA
became incorporated into efforts to improve the provision of potable water, another
important task when responding to an outbreak of cholera. This incorporation ensured
benefits that were two-fold. First, the participation of local knowledge guaranteed that
humanitarian relief efforts appropriately responded to the needs of Haitian citizens
following the outbreak. But more, coordination between UNICEF and preexisting local
infrastructure in the DINEPA promoted the development of Haitian capacity, an integral
step towards Haitian sovereignty.
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In addition, further coordination occurred between NGOs and Haitian agencies.
After the outbreak, the Ministry of Public Health and Population, the MSPP, outlined a
National Plan for the Elimination of Cholera in Haiti. The compilation and subsequent
recognition of this plan demonstrated the involvement of yet another Haitian agency in
the Cholera humanitarian response. In this plan, the ministry established that “the NGOs
will continue to provide their services within the framework of Haitian laws and in line
with MSPP and DINEPA directives.”271 By establishing this procedure, the Ministry of
Public Health and Population required that activities of the WASH cluster in response to
the cholera epidemic must work within preexisting systems. As a result, NGOs could not
create a parallel structure for service provision, but rather were forced to collaborate and
coordinate with Haitian agencies. For example, given this prerequisite, the Red Cross
collaborated with “WASH and Health partners to provide a temporary trucked
chlorinated water supply to facilities in the affected areas and communities in flooded
zones.”272 With this effort, the provision of potable water to affected regions of the
country, once again, involved local actors in the response effort. These local actors
included Haitian government agencies. As such, this participation proved historically
significant, deviating from parallel structures of aid that dominated Haitian development
for nearly two centuries. Further, working under Haitian systems also ensured that NGO
activity suitably fit the needs of the local population. The Ministry of Public Health and
Population recounted that “with technical support and guidance from DINEPA, [NGOs]
established more than 11,000 water points, carried out more than 400 drillings, and
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repaired nearly 100 potable water supply systems.273 Therefore, the WASH Cluster
encouraged participation not only between institutions such as the United Nations and
Haiti, but also between the plethora of humanitarian aid organizations within the country
and local administrations, organizations that otherwise threatened and undermined the
country’s sovereignty.
Praise for the efforts of the WASH Cluster is well deserved not only on behalf of
the effectiveness of relief aid, but also on behalf of building local capacity. With a wellcoordinated response to cholera, UNICEF, the DINEPA, the MSPP, and supporting
NGOs reduced the number of cases each month from a daunting 84,391 at the outset of
the epidemic in October of 2010, to 6,305 new cases in November of 2013. The fatality
rate also respectively dropped from 2.2% in October of 2010 to 1.2% in November three
years later.274 These numbers are surely telling of the accomplishments of the
institutionalized humanitarian response. Structural characteristics of the WASH cluster
propelled sanitation and potable water provision forward, mitigating the damage caused
by the arrival of cholera into Haiti. More importantly, the procedures within the WASH
cluster also propelled the infrastructure of Haiti towards building capacity, and
respectively, towards building sovereignty.
Through coordination with preexisting infrastructure and local knowledge, the
WASH cluster began a transition of power from the historically dominant foreign actors
to local Haitian administration. While the WASH cluster cannot erase the debilitating
history of the country, it can serve as a hopeful model for similar efforts. Nonetheless,
this new distribution of authority ushered in recognition of Haitian agency, previously
273
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unacknowledged by foreign aid. Humanitarian relief theory recognizes that the
international aid community is best suited to build the capacity of the state in order to
empower local administration for further development.275 Building capacity then entails
creating, strengthening, or maintaining programs through the commitment and
involvement of local government administration or infrastructure. Only through this
process, will the government adopt rightful responsibility and capability to progress as a
sovereign state.276 As a result, the nation can begin to gain agency. However, in Haiti this
transition proved to be a daunting task, often derailed by foreign actors failing to
coordinate with Haitian administration.
Work within the WASH cluster stands as an exemplary model. Haitian officials
recognized in the National Plan for the Elimination of Cholera that “the contributions of
NGOs to the provision of health services in Haiti [are] very important. However, the
Government will take steps to ensure that they are well integrated into the public health
system in order to support long-term objectives.”277 In 2011, the total number of NGOs
within this cluster exceeded 100, including Oxfam, Save the Children, World Concern,
Plan Haiti, Pure Water for the World, and Samaritan’s Purse. The National Plan for the
Elimination of Cholera represented the initiative taken by local institutions to shape the
response to the cholera epidemic. In particular, Haiti itself stressed the need for a binational response, with Haiti providing leadership and foreign actors providing needed
resources. Through this model the long-term capacity of the DINEPA water and
sanitation provision improved, ensuring a durable, sustainable solution extending beyond
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the cholera outbreak.278 While such a model is imperative in any humanitarian response
effort, it proves increasingly so in Haiti.
Historical patterns of foreign intervention predated the outbreak of cholera,
particularly during the Republic of NGOs and succeeding throughout the earthquake
response. This domination of foreign actors respectively sidelined Haitian institutions and
undermined Haitian agency. Therefore, the cholera outbreak, yet another human-made
disaster, offered a chance to begin to rewrite a story of debilitating foreign aid that
permeated the country’s history. Ascribing to previous models would only serve to
perpetuate the unfortunate reality through which Haiti suffers. However, the deviance
from this model displayed by the WASH cluster offered a hopeful paradigm of
development. This sustainable, participatory, and accessible model displayed a new path
for similar efforts in the years to come, optimistically pointing to signs and directions
ahead for the sovereignty of the nation.

Chapter Conclusion
Ironically, humanitarian relief within Haiti following the earthquake caused the
cholera crisis and necessitated further humanitarian intervention. Despite this unfortunate
reality, this chapter argued that the WASH cluster implemented a paradigm of aid that
aligned with theoretical models of downwards accountability and the incorporation of
local institutions, enabling a sustainable and effective response to an otherwise crippling
disaster. For Haiti, this model held significant importance as an instance of empowerment
of local agency, sovereignty, and capacity. Weakened by an earthquake, Haiti faced yet
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another challenge in October of the same year. An epidemic quickly hospitalized citizens
seeking medical treatment for an unknown disease, later identified as cholera. Sickness
and death across the country reached unmatched quantities. These numbers not only
represent lost mothers, fathers, children, friends, and community members, but also
signify the consequences of botched foreign intervention. First, paradoxically,
institutional United Nations MINUSTAH troops, responsible for maintaining peace,
brought a strain of the bacteria to the island country. The introduction of cholera rapidly
initiated yet another wave of chaos throughout the nation. Fear, confusion, and illness
characterized the country still deeply entrenched in a rebuilding effort. Without previous
exposure to the disease, Haitians lacked immunity, a reality that amplified the impact of
cholera. Therefore, the way in which cholera arrived in Haiti directly implicated
institutional humanitarian actors. Foreign actors, then, became incriminated in the
sickness and death that continued to batter an already debilitated country.
In addition, while it would be unfair to completely ignore the absence of Haitian
infrastructure prior to the outbreak, one can also recognize the implications of historically
predicated foreign intervention in the unsatisfactory water and sanitation conditions
predating the arrival of cholera within the country. The inability of the country to address
the substandard provision of services left leaders requesting foreign aid. Even prior to the
earthquake, this aid encountered difficulties to effective provision. Efforts to improve
preexisting systems remained after the earthquake, continuing to be lead by foreign
actors, perpetuating the role of foreigners in the rebuilding of the island nation. However,
as was the reality prior to the earthquake, these efforts met significant challenges to
deliver sanitation and potable water infrastructure to those in need. These challenges left
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Haitians across rural and urban regions of the country, as well as within IDP camps,
extremely vulnerable. As a result, conditions within Haiti prior to the arrival of the
cholera bacteria created the ideal environment for the spread of waterborne diseases.
However, in the midst of tragedy and widespread devastation initiated in 2010,
the humanitarian aid response to cholera pointed towards an empowering new direction
for the country. The recognition of Haitian agency within the WASH cluster initiated a
new phase of institutional humanitarian relief, a phase to build Haitian capacity. In
response to the epidemic, the WASH cluster, a sector of institutional humanitarian aid
took innovative steps. While other clusters ignored local coordination and subsequent
local knowledge, the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene cluster worked directly with preexisting Haitian institutions. Through co-leadership, meeting accessibility, and linguistic
accessibility, local voices could articulate needs, influencing the appropriation of
services. Thus, a country historically lacking sovereignty, leadership, and independence
gained responsibility in the sustainability of improvement projects. The involvement and
subsequent ownership allowed the country to build capacity. Haiti could gradually begin
to shed this debilitating and counter-productive reliance on foreign actors. Although
further sweeping transformations remained necessary to rectify dominant upward
accountability structures and foster more expansive local participation, the work of this
cluster offered a beacon of hope for the future of Haiti.
Thus, while the cholera epidemic literally impaired the Haitian citizens, the
disease simultaneously worked to abandon the country’s crippling dependence upon
foreign intervention, beginning a movement towards long-overdue sovereignty. Histories
of foreign occupation, foreign exploitation, and foreign dominance plague the country.
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An empty sack of a government not only encouraged, but also required the continued
presence and assistance of foreign actors. With an earthquake and a cholera epidemic, it
seemed as if the country would only continue to develop within the limits and visions of
foreign actors. However, the WASH sector served as a point of optimism. Local
coordination and capacity building moved this sector of Haitian administration in a
desirable direction. The rebuilding of infrastructure under the guide of the DINEPA “puts
the last first,” initiating a unique instance of abandonment of historical foreign
domination on behalf of the development of the country’s long-awaited sovereignty.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis critically analyzed the 7.0 magnitude earthquake in Haiti,
demonstrating that natural disasters are not truly natural. Rather, historical, economic,
cultural, and political processes imbricate a human influence in a “natural” disaster. This
“natural” disaster garnered heightened attention as the scale of loss and damage that
ensued far surpassed earthquakes of the similar magnitude in other countries. Scenes of
fear, grief, loss, and overwhelming rubble streamed out of the country for months and
years following January 12, 2010. The incredible devastation raised questions and doubts
in the minds of Haitians, as well as in the minds of many outsiders, as to why Haiti? Why
did the country seem to endure unequaled, extraordinary ruin? What enabled a 7.0
magnitude earthquake to affect unfathomable desolation to the small island country?
Thus, can this disaster be considered truly natural, or were other processes, human
processes to be exact, at play?
Through a lens of historical, environmental, economic, and political fields of
study, this thesis argued amongst its various forms, that foreign intervention- colonialism,
imperialism, military occupation, foreign aid, and humanitarian relief- within Haiti
exaggerated the scale of disaster. Building on this basic postulation, this thesis then
contended that this foreign intervention gave external actors political and ideological
influence during the development of Haiti, denigrating the agency of the country,
hindering the building of local capacity and sovereignty, and necessitating further forms
of aid. For Haiti this proved a detrimental cycle for the future of the country. The
interchangeable nature of foreign aid and foreign policy compounded by the
manipulation of altruistic acts of humanitarianism by donor policy contradicted
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philanthropic relief. As a result of these botched systems of aid, not only did the Haitian
population fail to receive the appropriate goods and services to efficiently recover from
disaster, but also the country remained in a position of dependence.
While past and present governance of Haiti deserved a portion of responsibility
for the aftermath of the earthquake, a history of crippling foreign intervention warranted
an overwhelming share of the burden. Greedy, mercenary motives and foreign policy
guided foreign activity within Haiti for centuries. French colonialism gave way to
American imperialism, which evolved into neoliberal intervention. Ultimately, this
intervention justified an unbelievable inundation of foreign aid and non-governmental
organizations to deliver humanitarian relief. Behind all of these forms of interventions lie
humans; people with connections to institutions promoting particular motives and
prescriptions for change, that further donor, political, economic, cultural, or ideological
demands. Yet theoretically, such decisions ought to be made on behalf of the benefit of
the impoverished population of Haiti lacking basic goods and services. As a result,
foreign actors dominated the development of Haiti for nearly two centuries. Human
processes intercepted the building of local capacity and sovereignty, acting rather on
behalf of subjective gains. Therefore, with this theme of external activity permeating the
country’s history, one can rightfully question: how much independence did Haiti truly
gain following 1804 and how was this then implicated in the scale of devastation caused
by the earthquake?
The earthquake in January of 2010, as well as the outbreak of cholera in October
of the same year, illuminated the relationship between foreign intervention and foreign
aid. The astounding images and accounts of loss rendered visible the ironic consequences
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of external domination and saturation of the country’s past and present development.
Humanitarian and foreign actors became directly implicated in the crisis. Days following
the earthquake, Haitians pulled loved ones out from the rubble of collapsed buildings.
Cries of sadness filled the streets along with rooftops, toppled houses, and the population
milling about in shock and confusion. Unfortunately, even as time passed, this
atmosphere of devastation did not. Moreover, following the outbreak of cholera, accounts
of overcrowded chaotic hospitals and mourning Haitians existed throughout the country.
For many observers, these scenes served as a wake-up call to the debilitating long-term
effects of colonialism, imperialism, globalization, neoliberalism, and paradoxically
foreign aid. Nonetheless, a frightening reality remained as many NGOs and multinational
agencies carried on with business as usual. Entrenched in systems of upward
accountability, loyalty to donors, and a prioritization of domestic needs rather than
beneficiary needs, foreign actors remain detrimental to the wellbeing of Haiti and similar
countries.
Four years removed from the earthquake, significant work still remains. Since
January 12, 2010 little rubble can be seen on the streets and most former inhabitants of
IDP camps now reside in some form of shelter.279 This progress does acknowledge the
role of NGOs to provide needed goods and services to the population, a role that the
Haitian government proved incapable of fulfilling. Nonetheless, the remaining 150,000
residents in camps, many who continue to lack water and electricity, offer a competing
conclusion.280 The suffering that persists within camps years after the disaster implores
for amendments to foreign aid, and particularly humanitarian relief efforts. First, this
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reality begs for reflections upon historical implications of foreign intervention. Countries
with a similar history to that of Haiti, like Jamaica, exist in an analogous position of
vulnerability.281 Exploitation and domination of domestic affairs by foreign actors place
these countries unjustly at the mercy of demands from more economically powerful
nations. Second, prolonged subhuman conditions appeal to current humanitarian aid
practices. As the quantity of NGOs remains high throughout the global community, these
providers of foreign aid remain in positions to affect positive change by improving the
welfare and livelihood of suffering populations. However, the performance of an
overwhelming sum of non-governmental organizations in the aftermath of the earthquake
in Haiti challenged this hope. Skewed systems of aid served donors rather than the
recipient population. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Haitians lived through
subhuman conditions despite an incredible outpouring of private and public relief efforts.
Therefore, through a case study of the earthquake in Haiti, this thesis revealed the
implications of foreign activity and humanitarian aid in a “natural” disaster.
Yet, amidst overwhelming cynicism and frustration, this thesis concluded by
pointing the way toward an accountable, sustainable system of relief. Through the
response to cholera, a bitterly paradoxical humanitarian crisis, this thesis argued for aid
that incorporates local participation, recognizes preexisting agency, and builds local
capacity. For Haiti and other similar nations, these structures initiated a deviation from a
demeaning and debilitating history of foreign intervention. The efforts and structures
exemplified by the WASH cluster offered a new model for humanitarian aid. This model,
while only embodying a small portion of humanitarian activity within a country
entrenched in consequences of historical foreign intervention, offered a hopeful way
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forward. Through the recognition of preexisting agency and the respective incorporation
of this agency, foreign aid under the WASH cluster prioritized local needs. Not only did
the work of this cluster then address the epidemic in a timely manner, but also began to
empower Haitian institutions. This paradigm of aid initiated a new phase in the
development of Haiti, a phase dictated by local administration and hope for the future
capability of the country. Thus, hope remains; in this specific instance of aid, the way
forward for a nation dominated by foreign activity seems illuminated by agency and
sovereignty.
In an interview, Dr. Louise Ivers emphatically contended that Haiti is a sovereign
nation and it would be wrong to think otherwise. However, I beg the question, who
recognizes this sovereignty? Can a country, saturated with foreign intervention both
historically and presently truly express this sovereignty? A synthesis of the arguments of
this thesis would answer that only through the implementation of relief systems that
acknowledge and incorporate local agency can a nation rebuild. In Haiti, this model
encourages a justified and overdue recognition by outsiders of the country’s sovereignty
and rightful independence. Beyond this small island nation, foreign intervention that
compounds devastation is not an isolated case. Other nations throughout the global
community are not immune to similar ills. Thus, while wide-sweeping change seems
daunting, the implications of continued unfavorable foreign aid and humanitarian relief
practices prove even more frightening.
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